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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
2.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
 
Estimates from the Irish adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version 3 (SAPM3) suggest: 
1. Minimum unit pricing policies (MUP) would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, 
alcohol-related harms (including alcohol-related deaths, hospitalisations, crimes and 
workplace absences) and the costs associated with those harms. 
2. A ban on below-cost selling (implemented as a ban on selling alcohol for below the cost of 
duty plus the VAT payable on that duty) would have a negligible impact on alcohol 
consumption or related harms. 
3. A ban on price-based promotions in the off-trade, either alone or in tandem with an MUP 
policy would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, related harms and associated 
costs. 
4. MUP and promotion ban policies would only have a small impact on low risk drinkers. 
Somewhat larger impacts would be experienced by increasing risk drinkers, with the most 
substantial effects being experienced by high risk drinkers. 
5. MUP and promotion ban policies would have larger impacts on those in poverty, particularly 
high risk drinkers in poverty, than on those not in poverty. However; those in poverty also 
experience larger relative gains in health and are estimated to very marginally save money 
due to their reduced drinking under the majority of policies. 
 
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 What is the estimated impact of MUP policies ranging from 40c to 120c per standard drink? 
 What is the estimated impact of a ban on below-cost selling? 
 What is the estimated impact of a ban on price-based promotions in the off-licensed trade? 
 How do these impacts vary by drinker group (low risk, increasing risk, high risk) and by 
income group (in poverty, not in poverty)? 
 
2.3 METHODS USED 
 
The Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) has been used previously in England and in Scotland to 
analyse the potential effects of pricing policies.  We have developed a new version of the model to 
incorporate data and evidence relating to the Republic of Ireland population. 
The research has obtained data and evidence from available sources as follows: 
 Alcohol consumption – National Alcohol Diary Survey (NADS) 
 Alcohol prices in supermarkets and other off-trade outlets – Nielsen Ltd 
 Alcohol prices in pubs, bars and other on-trade outlets – NADS 
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 Alcohol preferences and prices paid for different types of beverages by different population 
subgroups – NADS 
 Price elasticities – previously published research  
 Hospital Discharge rates for Alcohol Related Diseases - Hospital In-Patient Enquiry (HIPE) 
data 
 Mortality rates for Alcohol Related Diseases - National Drug-Related Death Index (NDRDI) & 
General Mortality Register (GMR) 
 Costs of Healthcare for Alcohol Related Diseases – Healthcare Pricing Office (HPO) data 
 Crime Rates – Central Statistics Office publications of recorded crime rates & Garda 
estimates of recording rates 
 Costs of Policing and Justice – Adjusted from UK Home Office estimates of unit costs of crime 
using data from Hope et al. 2009 
 Work absence rates, work participation rates and average salary rates by population 
subgroups – NADS & European Union – Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)  
The model synthesises all of this data and evidence and models the estimated impact of possible 
future pricing policies on alcohol consumption patterns, spending, and health (both short-term and 
over a long-term 20 year horizon).  
 
2.4 SUMMARY OF MODEL FINDINGS 
2.4.1 Patterns of drinking and expenditure 
 
F1. The evidence estimates that within the overall population aged 18+, the proportion of people 
who don’t drink, drink at low risk (less than 16.8 std. drinks per week for men and 11.2 for women), 
increasing risk (16.8-40 std. drinks per week for men and 11.2-28 for women), and high risk (more 
than 40 std. drinks per week for men and 28 for women) levels are 22.1%, 56.3%, 16.4% and 5.2% 
respectively1.  
F2. Low risk drinkers consume on average 4.5 standard drinks per week, spending €508 per annum 
on alcohol. Increasing risk drinkers consume 21.9 standard drinks per week, spending €2,218 per 
annum and high risk drinkers consume on average 62.5 standard drinks per week, spending €5,120 
per annum. These patterns differ somewhat when examined by income group, with high risk 
drinkers in poverty (1.0% of the population) estimated to drink 75.3 standard drinks per week, 
spending €5,055 per annum, whilst high risk drinkers above the defined poverty line (4.2% of the 
population) consume 59.5 standard drinks per week and spend €5,136 a year. 
F3. Overall, increasing risk and high risk drinkers combined (22% of the population) account for 66% 
of all alcohol consumption and 61% of all spending on alcohol. 
F4. Prices vary by type of beverage.  When examining a potential minimum price for a standard drink 
(a floor price below which no alcohol may legally be sold) of 90c, the evidence suggests that 89.4% 
                                                          
1
 These categorisations are based on average consumption levels only and do not account for patterns in 
consumption, as there is no clear international consensus on how to combine both factors into a single 
categorisation; however these patterns are accounted for in all modelling work presented in this report  
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of off-trade beer, 66.9% of off-trade wine, and 79.9% of off-trade spirits sold in the year 2013 would 
be affected and incur a price rise. Overall, an estimated 64%, 79% and 87% of the off-trade drinks 
sold would be affected by an 80c, 90c and 100c minimum unit price (MUP) respectively.  
2.4.2 Effect of modelled policies on consumption and expenditure 
 
F5. For a 90c MUP, the estimated reduction in alcohol consumption per drinker2 for the overall 
population is 6.2%. In absolute terms this equates to an annual reduction of 38.7 standard drinks per 
drinker per year. The equivalent figures for a 100c MUP are 8.8% and 55.4 standard drinks. The 
lower modelled MUP policies are estimated to have very small impacts; however, effectiveness 
increases steeply at 70c and above (70c = -1.9%, 80c = -3.8%, 90c= -6.2%). 
F6. High risk drinkers have much larger estimated consumption reductions for MUP policies than 
increasing risk or low risk drinkers. For a 90c MUP the estimated reductions are 10.7% for high risk 
drinkers, 5.1% for increasing risk drinkers and 1.9% for low risk drinkers. Differences in absolute 
consumption reductions are significantly larger, with high risk drinkers reducing their consumption 
by 350 standard drinks per year (6.7 per week) for a 90c MUP, compared to a reduction of 58 for 
increasing risk drinkers and 4.4 standard drinks per year for low risk drinkers. Absolute reductions 
are also larger for those in poverty (e.g. a reduction of 57.7 standard drinks per year vs. 34.8 on 
average for those not in poverty). This demonstrates that MUP policies are well targeted, achieving a 
higher proportional reduction in consumption amongst increasing and high risk drinkers than 
amongst the majority of drinkers who drink at low risk levels. 
F7. A ban on below-cost selling is estimated to have almost no impact on population consumption (-
0.0%), spending (+50c per drinker per year), health outcomes (166 fewer hospital admissions per 
year) or crime (3 fewer crimes per year). 
F8. A ban on off-trade promotions is estimated to have a similar impact to a 70c MUP, with an 
estimated reduction in average consumption of 1.8%, leading to 45 fewer alcohol-related deaths and 
1,382 fewer hospital admissions. As with MUP policies a promotion ban is well targeted, with higher 
proportional consumption reductions amongst increasing and high risk drinkers. 
F9. Under MUP and promotion ban policies, drinkers are estimated to reduce consumption but pay 
slightly more on average per standard drink consumed, and so estimated percentage changes in 
spending are smaller than estimated changes in consumption. For all modelled policies, spending 
across the whole population is estimated to increase, for example by €14.90 (+1.27%) per drinker 
per year for a 90c MUP alongside a consumption change of –6.2%. Spending changes also differ 
across the population, with high risk drinkers estimated to have a small saving of €35.80 (-0.70%) per 
year whilst low risk drinkers spending increases by €18.50 (+0.84%) per year under a 90c MUP. 
Those in poverty are estimated to reduce spending under the majority of policies, whilst those not in 
poverty increase their spending (e.g. -€15.70 and +€21.20 per year respectively under a 90c MUP). 
F10. Under all modelled policies revenue to the Exchequer (from duty and VAT receipts) is estimated 
to decrease slightly, with a 1.3% reduction (equivalent to €21.4m) for a 90c MUP.  This is likely to be 
                                                          
2
 Here, and elsewhere in this report, consumption reductions are reported per drinker unless explicitly stated 
otherwise 
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at least partially offset by a reduction in VAT reclaims from retailers selling alcohol for below cost 
price. Revenue to retailers is estimated to increase across all policies, with an increase of €62.6m 
(3.8%) under a 90c MUP. The vast majority of this is accrued in the off-trade, although on-trade 
retailers are estimated to gain slightly under MUP policies (e.g. 0.7% or €9.3m under a 90c MUP).  
Under a promotions ban on-trade retailers are estimated to suffer a small loss (0.2% or €2.8m), 
whilst off-trade retailers would gain (7.3% or €27.4m). 
 
2.4.3 Effects of modelled policies on alcohol-related harms 
 
F11. There are substantial estimated reductions in alcohol-related harms from all modelled policies, 
with an estimated reduction of 139 deaths and 4,102 fewer hospital admissions per year for a 90c 
MUP. Equivalent figures for a promotion ban are around one third of this level, at 45 and 1,382. As 
there is evidence of a time lag between changes in consumption and changes in rates of harm for 
some alcohol-related health conditions (e.g. various cancer rates increase 10 to 20 years after 
consumption increases), annual changes in health outcomes are reported accruing over the long-
term (using the 20th year following implementation of the policy as a proxy for this). Partial effects at 
1, 5, 10 and 15 years are also reported for selected outcomes.  
F12. For all policies, the majority of the reductions in deaths and hospitalisations are experienced by 
those above the poverty line; however, this group also makes up the large majority (81.1%) of the 
population. Accounting for this difference, all modelled policies are estimated to have greater 
reductions in deaths and hospital admissions per 100,000 population for those in poverty than those 
not in poverty (e.g. 4 fewer deaths and 154 fewer hospital admissions per 100,000 population for 
those in poverty under a 90c MUP vs. 4 fewer deaths and 107 fewer hospital admissions for those 
not in poverty). 
F13. Direct costs to healthcare services are estimated to reduce under all modelled policies, with 
savings of at least €1m in the first year following implementation of the policy for a promotion ban 
and all MUP thresholds above 60c.  The estimated savings for a 90c MUP are €5.2m in year 1 and 
€178.1m cumulatively over 20 years.  
F14. Crime is expected to fall, with an estimated 1,043 fewer offences per year under a 90c MUP 
policy. High risk drinkers, who comprise 5.2% of the population, account for 33% of this reduction. 
Costs of crime are estimated to reduce by €4.9m in year 1 under this policy, with higher MUP 
thresholds providing even greater savings (e.g. €11.5m in year 1 for an MUP of 120c). 
F15. Workplace absence is estimated to fall under all modelled policies, with a reduction of 77,800 
fewer absent days for a 90c MUP and 21,400 for a promotion ban. 
F16. For a 90c MUP policy, the total societal value of the harm reductions for health, crime and 
workplace absence is estimated at €1.2bn cumulatively over the 20 year period modelled. This figure 
includes reduced direct healthcare costs, savings from reduced crime and policing, savings from 
reduced workplace absence and a financial valuation of the health benefits measured in terms of 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs valued at €45,000 in line with guidelines from the National Centre 
for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE) on the cost-effectiveness of health technologies). The equivalent 
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figure for the total societal value of the harm reductions for a ban on promotions is estimated as 
€126m, and for a 100c MUP is €1.7bn. 
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3 INTRODUCTION 
3.1  BACKGROUND 
 
In 2009, the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group (SARG) at Sheffield University developed the Sheffield 
Alcohol Policy Model version 2.0 (SAPM) to appraise the potential impact of alcohol policies, 
including different levels of MUP, for the population of England [1]. This model has subsequently 
been adapted to a range of international settings, including Scotland, Canada and Italy [2–4]. 
Since 2009, the methodology that underpins SAPM has been further developed and refined. Some of 
these methodological advances have previously been described elsewhere [5,6]; however, the 
present report incorporates a number of additional improvements which are described here. In 
order to avoid confusion with previous versions of the model, the current version is referred to as 
SAPM3 throughout this report. 
In 2013, SARG were commissioned by the Irish government to adapt the Sheffield Model to the 
Republic of Ireland in order to appraise the potential impact of a range of alcohol pricing policies. 
The current report presents the results of this work. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
 
The primary set of policies analysed in this report are MUP policies with thresholds of 40c, 50c,…, 
120c per standard drink. This analysis uses 2013 as the baseline year and we assume that these price 
thresholds are held constant in real terms over the length of the 20 year modelling period. The main 
research questions are concerned with the likely effects of introducing an MUP on alcohol 
consumption, spending, sales, health, crime and workplace absenteeism in Ireland. 
This report also provides analysis of the impact of the following additional policy options: 
1. A ban on price-based promotions in the off-licensed trade in Ireland 
2. A ban on ‘below-cost selling’ – i.e. selling below the cost of duty plus VAT payable on the 
duty – in Ireland 
3. A combination of the analysed MUP policies with a ban on price-based promotions in the 
off-licensed trade in Ireland. 
For comparative purposes the report also presents the effects of a 10% price rise on all alcohol 
products. 
 
14 
 
4 METHODS 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF SAPM3 
 
The aim of SAPM3 is to appraise pricing policy options via cost-benefit analyses. The aims have been 
broken down into a linked series of policy impacts to be modelled: 
 The effect of the policy on the distribution of prices for different types of alcohol 
 The effect of changes in price distributions on patterns of both on-trade and off-trade 
alcohol consumption 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on revenue for retailers and the 
exchequer 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on consumer spending on alcohol 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on levels of alcohol-related health 
harms 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on levels of crime 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on levels of workplace absenteeism. 
To estimate these effects, two connected models have been built: 
1. A model of the relationship between alcohol prices and alcohol consumption which accounts 
for the relationship between: average weekly alcohol consumption, the patterns in which that 
alcohol is drunk and how these are distributed within the population considering gender, age, 
income and consumption level. 
2. A model of the relationship between: (1) both average level and patterns of alcohol 
consumption, and (2) harms related to health, crime and workplace absenteeism and the costs 
associated with these harms. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates this conceptual framework. 
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Figure 4.1: High-level conceptual framework of SAPM3 
 
4.2 MODELLING THE LINK BETWEEN INTERVENTION AND CONSUMPTION 
4.2.1 Overview 
 
The pricing model uses a simulation framework based on classical econometrics. The fundamental 
concept is that: (i) a current consumption dataset is held for the population, (ii) a policy gives rise to 
a change in price, (iii) a change in consumption is estimated from the price change using the price 
elasticity of demand, and (iv) the consumption change is used to update the current consumption 
dataset. Due to data limitations, the change in patterns of drinking is estimated indirectly via a 
change in mean consumption. 
As is the case in England, no single dataset exists for Ireland which contains the necessary data on 
both prices paid and consumption. Therefore the link between price and consumption was modelled 
using different datasets. This section provides an overview of the data sources on alcohol 
consumption and pricing which were used, before detailing the procedures for modelling the effect 
that price-based policy interventions have on consumption. 
4.2.2 Consumption data 
 
The National Alcohol Diary Survey (NADS) was commissioned in 2013 by the Health Research Board 
(HRB) in Ireland and carried out by Ipsos MRBI on a sample of around 6,000 individuals. The survey 
records a range of demographic data on respondents, including: age, sex and mean weekly 
consumption of alcohol. In addition, the survey incorporates a diary element in which respondents 
are asked about their alcohol purchases in the previous week, including data on the location of 
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purchases, the type and quantity of alcohol purchased and the price paid. The survey also includes 
questions on workplace absence. 
There are a number of ways in which the data could be used to derive a mean weekly consumption 
for each respondent. Whilst the diary data provides full details of all alcohol drunk in the week 
preceding the survey, we do not know whether this week was typical of the respondent’s usual 
consumption. The NADS survey also included questions on the quantity and frequency of usual 
consumption, asking respondents how frequently they drank and how much they usually drank for 
beer, wine and spirits separately. These questions were used to derive the baseline mean weekly 
consumption in the NADS population who were used as the baseline population for the model 
(N=5,964)3. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present the distribution of mean weekly consumption by age 
and sex.  
Figure 4.2: Distribution of mean weekly consumption (in standard drinks) by age group 
(NADS 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 As these questions did not cover cider consumption this was imputed based on subgroup-level purchasing 
data from the NADS diary. Further details can be found in Section 4.2.5 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of mean weekly consumption by gender (NADS 2013) 
 
In order to estimate the differential impact of alcohol policies on different income groups it is 
necessary to partition the baseline population into those in poverty and those not in poverty4. Whilst 
the NADS survey did include a question on net household income, this was categorical. In addition, 
the calculation of equivalised household income requires a measure of the composition of the 
household of the respondent (i.e. the number of adults and children in the household).  
We obtained data from the European Union – Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
survey for Ireland for 2009-2011 (N=35,275) which contains data on the age, gender, household 
composition, net household income, and equivalised household income for each respondent. This 
was combined with the limited data available in the NADS data on household composition and the 
categorical income data in order to estimate the joint distribution of equivalised household income 
with these variables, age and gender. An equivalised household income for each respondent was 
imputed, taking the mean of 1,000 samples from the joint distribution for each NADS respondent. 
The population in poverty were those NADS respondents with an imputed equivalised household 
income less than 60% of the median of all imputed equivalised household incomes for the NADS 
respondents, accounting for survey weights.  The remainder of respondents were assigned to the 
not in poverty group.  Almost a fifth of respondents (18.9%) were estimated to be in poverty. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Poverty is defined here, as elsewhere in the model, as an individual having an equivalised household income 
below 60% of the population median. 
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The baseline population is divided into three drinker groups: 
 Low risk drinkers5 – those whose usual alcohol intake is no more than 16.8/11.2 standard 
drinks per week for men/women (1 standard drink = 10g of ethanol) 
 Increasing risk drinkers – those drinkers consuming 16.8-40 standard drinks per week for 
men or 11.2-28 standard drinks per week for women 
 High risk drinkers – drinkers whose usual alcohol intake exceeds 40/28 standard drinks per 
week for men/women.6 
Overall, from the NADS data, 22.1% of the adult population (18+) are abstainers, 56.3% are low risk 
drinkers, 16.4% are increasing risk drinkers and 5.2% are high risk drinkers. On average low risk 
drinkers consume 4.3 standard drinks per week, increasing risk drinkers consume 21.5 standard 
drinks and high risk drinkers consume 63.4 standard drinks. Figure 4.4 illustrates how consumption 
patterns differ between those in poverty and those not in poverty. Individuals below the poverty line 
are more likely to be abstainers (29.8% vs. 20.3%), while at the upper end of the spectrum they are 
also slightly more likely to drink at high risk levels (5.3% vs. 5.2%). Within the low risk and increasing 
risk drinker groups, those below the poverty line drink less on average (3.9 and 20.5 standard drinks 
per week vs. 4.4 and 21.7 standard drinks respectively), whereas high risk drinkers in poverty drink 
more than those above the poverty line (78.0 standard drinks per week on average vs. 59.3 standard 
drinks). 
Figure 4.4: Population distribution by drinker and income group (NADS 2013) 
 
An unavoidable issue with the use of self-reported survey data on alcohol consumption is that of 
under-coverage. The implied total annual alcohol consumption in Ireland from the NADS survey data 
is 18.8 million litres, compared to total sales figures of 38.2 million litres published by the Revenue 
Commissioners, suggesting the survey data accounts for 49.3% of total alcohol sales. There may be a 
                                                          
5
 Note that the terminology ‘low risk’ is used to align with the Health Service Executive (HSE) drinking 
guidelines [26] 
6
 These consumption groups match the moderate, hazardous and harmful definitions used in previous versions 
of SAPM. 
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number of issues driving this discrepancy (summarised in Meier et al. [7]) but the key issue is likely 
to be under-reporting of their true consumption by the survey respondents, either deliberately or 
because of recall issues. Methods have been proposed to ‘up-shift’ the reported consumption to 
account for this under-reporting [8]; however, these methods require the assumption that under-
reporting varies by drinking level only, whilst there is evidence that under-reporting rates also vary 
by age and gender [9]. Furthermore, the published risk-relationships for alcohol-related health 
conditions are predominantly based on self-reported alcohol consumption and therefore any 
adjustment of self-reported data to account for under-reporting will introduce unknown biases into 
estimates of the impact on these conditions. In view of these issues we make no adjustments to the 
alcohol consumption levels reported by the NADS respondents. 
4.2.3 Patterns of consumption 
 
In addition to mean weekly consumption of alcohol, a significant number of the harms modelled in 
SAPM3 are a function of intoxication; that is to say that they are related to the patterns in which 
alcohol is drunk, not just the overall volume consumed. This is accounted for in the model in two 
ways:  
 For acute health conditions (i.e. those related to intoxication) which are wholly attributable 
to alcohol (e.g. ethanol poisoning)  we use peak consumption in the previous week as a 
proxy measure for consumption patterns and relate this measure to wholly-attributable 
acute health conditions, crime harms and workplace absence. Data from the diary 
component of the NADS survey was used to calculate the number of standard drinks 
consumed on the day in the diary week on which the respondent consumed the most.  
 Figure 4.5 shows how the distribution of this varies by gender. 
 For acute health conditions which are partially attributable to alcohol (e.g. transport injuries) 
a new method has been applied which accounts for the heterogeneity of an individual’s 
drinking patterns across the whole year and the impact this has on their risk of suffering 
intoxication-related harm (see Section 4.3.4.3 for details).  
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of peak day maximum consumption by gender (NADS 2013) 
  
 
4.2.4 Prices 
Data on the prices paid for alcohol beverages is derived from the spending element of the NADS 
diary data. For each drink that the NADS respondent had in the last week they are asked what type 
of drink it was, how much they bought, where they bought it and how much they paid. Previously 
published estimates of alcohol content for each beverage [7] were used to convert this data into 
estimates of the number of standard drinks and the price per standard drink for each entry into the 
diary. Every entry was assigned to one of 5 beverage categories: beer, cider, wine, spirits and Ready-
To-Drinks (RTDs) or alcopops. Each entry was also assigned as being purchased in either the on-trade 
(e.g. bars or restaurants) or the off-trade (e.g. supermarkets or convenience shops). 
Off-trade price distributions for Ireland based on aggregated sales data were obtained from the 
Nielsen Company by the Health Research Board on behalf of the Department of Health for the 
purposes of this project. These distributions, giving the total sales volume for 2013 in each of 24 
beverage categories (e.g. whiskey, lager) at each of 17 price bands (<25c/std. drink, 25-30c/std. 
drink,…,>100c/std. drink) were used to adjust the NADS off-trade prices using the same 
methodology as previous versions of the Sheffield Model [1]. This adjustment is undertaken as sales 
data from Nielsen is considered to be the gold-standard for off-trade price data, as compared to the 
self-reported purchasing data obtained from NADS. No price distributions were available for the on-
trade and so the raw distributions from the NADS data were used. Figure 4.6 illustrates the 
unadjusted and adjusted price distributions for the off-trade, while Figure 4.7 presents the final on- 
and off-trade price distributions used in the model. 
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Figure 4.6: NADS (raw) and Neilsen (adjusted) price distributions for off-trade beverages (RTDs not shown) 
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 Figure 4.7: Final on- and off-trade price distributions used in SAPM3 
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It should be noted that the off-trade price distributions derived from the NADS data differ 
significantly from the Neilsen sales distributions, with the respondents to the NADS survey appearing 
to substantially overestimate the price of their drinks. There are a number of possible explanations 
for this apparent discrepancy, for example there may be an issue of recall when using this 
retrospective diary method (previous versions of SAPM have used prospective diary data in which 
respondents record the prices they pay for drinks during the survey week and may be more 
conscious of the price at the time of purchase). There may also be an element of bias introduced 
through missing price data, for example if different population subgroups are more or less likely to 
report the prices they paid for their drinks. Therefore, it is possible that by adjusting the NADS data 
to the Neilsen sales data we may underestimate the prices people pay in the off-trade. This could 
potentially lead to pricing policies appearing more effective as a greater proportion of off-trade 
purchases are estimated to be affected. We also should consider the fact that, in the absence of 
sales data for the on-trade, we use the unadjusted NADS price distributions for on-trade sales. If 
these are an overestimate of the true prices paid then this will slightly overestimate the 
effectiveness of pricing policies. Prices tend to be considerably higher in the on- rather than the off-
trades, therefore this effect is likely to be small because relatively few on-trade purchases will be 
affected by any of the pricing policies modelled for this report. 
Table 4.1 shows the proportion of alcohol within each category sold below several price thresholds. 
Although SAPM works on subgroup-specific price distributions, these figures provide an 
approximation of the overall proportion of alcohol within each category which would be affected by 
differing levels of MUP. It is apparent that these policies have a minimal impact on on-trade prices 
and mainly target off-trade prices. 
Table 4.1: Proportion of alcohol sold in Ireland below a range of MUP thresholds 
  Proportions sold below thresholds (2013 prices) 
80c 90c 100c 
Off-trade beer 82.6% 89.4% 93.1% 
Off-trade cider 73.4% 86.2% 87.9% 
Off-trade wine 46.3% 66.9% 80.4% 
Off-trade spirits 70.0% 79.9% 87.9% 
Off-trade RTDs 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
On-trade beer 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 
On-trade cider 0.0% 0.8% 1.1% 
On-trade wine 1.2% 1.2% 1.9% 
On-trade spirits 2.4% 2.4% 2.7% 
On-trade RTDs 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
The price data in Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1 are for the whole population of Ireland; 
however, purchasing behaviour varies across the drinking and income spectra. Figure 4.8 shows the 
proportion and quantity of each drinker groups’ standard drinks which would be affected by a 90c 
MUP stratified by those above and below the poverty line. It shows that those living in poverty 
purchase a greater proportion of their alcohol, both relatively and absolutely, below 90c per 
standard drink at each level of drinking. It also shows that high risk drinkers purchase significantly 
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more of their alcohol below this threshold than low risk drinkers (55% vs. 34% for those below the 
poverty line and 42% vs. 29% for those above it). This indicates that low income drinkers will be 
more affected by MUP than those on higher incomes and that high risk drinkers will be more 
affected than low risk drinkers at all levels of income. 
Figure 4.8: Number and proportion of std. drinks purchased at below 90c by income and 
drinker group 
 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the proportion of total alcohol consumption and total spending on alcohol 
attributable to each drinker group. It shows that whilst increasing risk and high risk drinkers 
constitute only 17% of the population, they consume 66% of all alcohol and account for 61% of 
spending on drink. 
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Figure 4.9: Proportion of total consumption and spending by drinker group 
 
 
4.2.5 Beverage preferences  
 
As illustrated by Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1, the impact of pricing policies will vary substantially 
between beverage categories (as defined by beverage type: beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs and 
by purchase location: on- or off-trade). Therefore, it is crucial to capture the heterogeneity of 
beverage preferences between different subgroups of the population. For each individual NADS 
respondent, their preferences for beer, wine and spirits are captured by the beverage-specific 
quantity-frequency questions which are asked in the survey. RTD consumption is estimated to be a 
proportion of their reported spirits consumption, with the ratio of spirits to RTDs determined by the 
mean ratio of spirits to RTD purchases in the diary data for respondents in the same age-gender-
income subgroup (defined in terms of sex (male/female), age (16-24, 25-34, 35-54 & 55+), income 
(in poverty/not in poverty) and consumption level (low risk /increasing risk/high risk)). Cider 
consumption is estimated similarly by taking the mean subgroup proportion of standard drinks 
purchased in the diary data which are cider. Note that this estimated cider consumption is added to 
the individual’s self-reported beer, wine and spirit consumption in order to estimate their overall 
alcohol consumption. For each beverage category the split between on- and off- trade purchases is 
also estimated from the subgroup average split in the NADS diary data. 
This produces a 10-element ‘preference vector’ for each respondent representing the proportion of 
their usual consumption which is attributable to each beverage category. 
Figure 4.10 to Figure 4.13 show how these preferences vary across the population, both in terms of 
beverage category and location. For example, Figure 4.12 shows that a larger proportion of high risk 
drinkers’ consumption is beer than is the case for low risk drinkers (57% vs. 47%), while Figure 4.13 
shows that people living in poverty drink more cider (14% vs. 9%) and less wine (13% vs. 23%) than 
those above the poverty line and that slightly more of their drinking takes place at home rather than 
in the on-trade (48% vs. 45%). When interpreting these figures it is important to note that they 
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indicate the proportion of standard drinks consumed which are of each beverage type and in each 
location. So, for example, whilst spirits make up a decreasing proportion of total consumption as 
total consumption increases (17% for low risk drinkers, 14% for increasing risk drinkers and 13% for 
high risk drinkers), the actual volume of spirits consumed increases with consumption (39 std. drinks 
per year for low risk drinkers, 157 for increasing risk drinkers and 429 for high risk drinkers). 
Figure 4.10: Consumption preferences by gender 
 
Figure 4.11: Consumption preferences by age 
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Figure 4.12: Consumption preferences by drinker group 
  
Figure 4.13: Consumption preferences by income group 
  
4.2.6 Price elasticities of alcohol demand 
 
The Sheffield Alcohol Research Group have recently applied a new ‘pseudo-panel’ methodology to 
individual transaction level data from 9 years of the UK’s Living Costs and Food Survey (formerly the 
Expenditure and Food Survey) (LCFS/EFS) (N=227,933 transactions) to provide new estimates of the 
price elasticities of demand for alcohol. Full details of this model have been described elsewhere [8]. 
In order to apply this methodology, a single dataset is required which contains data about an 
individual’s alcohol purchasing, including data on volume purchased and the price paid as well as the 
type of alcohol together with demographic data about the individual (e.g. age and sex). This dataset 
must also include data from several different time periods in order to allow estimates of the 
relationship over time between changes in price and changes in consumption. 
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The Central Statistical Office’s Household Budget Survey (HBS) is a purchasing diary similar to the 
LCFS/EFS which was conducted in 1987, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. Unfortunately, the existing 
datasets do not include data on the volume of alcohol (or alcoholic beverage) purchased in each 
transaction. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate the price paid per standard drink, which is the 
independent variable in the elasticity model. 
As an alternative, we attempted to estimate price elasticities using the NADS diary data. As this 
represents a single wave of data it was not possible to apply the pseudo-panel method. An 
alternative method of deriving elasticities is to fit a Tobit model to the price data; however, this form 
of model specification is known to have a number of issues which can lead to elasticity estimates 
which are substantially larger than those estimated from large-scale international meta-analyses [9]. 
In order to solve this issue, identical Tobit models were fitted to the NADS data and the LCFS/EFS 
data for England. The English Tobit results were then compared to the “gold standard” pseudo-panel 
elasticities. The ratios between the two were applied to the Irish Tobit results in order to estimate 
what an Irish version of the pseudo-panel analysis might look like. Table 4.2 presents the results of 
this analysis, whilst the pseudo-panel elasticity matrix is shown in Table 4.3. Comparison of elasticity 
estimates from the NADS and LCF/EFS were only performed for beer, wine and spirits as the sample 
sizes for cider and RTDs were relatively small in the NADS dataset. Similarly, elasticities from a 
reduced pseudo-model containing beer, wine and spirits was used to obtain adjustment ratios. 
Table 4.2: Elasticity estimates from the Irish and English Tobit models and the final adjusted 
Irish figures 
RoI Tobit 
Off-trade On-trade 
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits 
Off-trade 
Beer -1.10 -0.98 -1.60 1.67 -1.25 -2.65 
Wine 0.42 -1.22 -0.35 1.57 2.72 1.05 
Spirits -0.21 0.45 -1.80 -0.99 -0.56 -0.51 
On-trade 
Beer 1.07 -0.34 -1.03 -1.07 -0.09 0.60 
Wine 0.81 0.74 1.88 -1.61 -1.81 -0.93 
Spirits 0.09 0.47 1.41 -1.42 0.46 -1.48 
 
LCFS/EFS Tobit 
Off-trade On-trade 
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits 
Off-trade 
Beer -1.90 0.08 -0.26 0.06 0.36 0.27 
Wine -0.11 -0.77 0.24 0.22 0.66 0.54 
Spirits 0.17 0.18 -1.55 0.33 0.26 0.28 
On-trade 
Beer 0.11 0.67 0.55 -1.03 1.09 0.60 
Wine 0.12 0.13 0.39 -0.40 -1.36 0.11 
Spirits 0.10 0.34 -0.31 -0.58 0.72 -2.15 
 
Adjusted RoI 
Off-trade On-trade 
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits 
Off-trade 
Beer -0.57 -0.98 -2.23 -0.26 -0.88 -0.18 
Wine 0.16 -0.59 -0.52 -1.78 0.24 -0.38 
Spirits -0.16 0.46 -0.13 -0.46 -0.03 -0.10 
On-trade 
Beer 1.50 -0.06 0.08 -0.78 -0.09 1.20 
Wine -1.28 -0.89 -0.19 -1.03 -1.16 -0.06 
Spirits 0.02 -0.02 1.29 -0.03 0.07 -0.62 
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Table 4.3: Pseudo-panel elasticity estimates for the UK 
  
Purchase 
Off-beer Off-cider Off-wine Off-spirits Off-RTDs On-beer On-cider On-wine On-spirits On-RTDs 
Price 
Off-beer -0.980* -0.189 0.096 -0.368 -1.092 -0.016 -0.050 0.253 0.030 0.503 
Off-cider 0.065 -1.268* 0.118 -0.122 -0.239 -0.053 0.093 0.067 -0.108 -0.194 
Off-wine -0.040 0.736* -0.384* 0.363 0.039 -0.245 -0.155 0.043 -0.186 0.110 
Off-spirits 0.113 -0.024 0.163 -0.082 -0.042 0.167 0.406 0.005 0.084 0.233 
Off-RTDs -0.047 -0.159 -0.006 0.079 -0.585* -0.061 0.067 0.068 -0.179* 0.093 
On-beer 0.148 -0.285 0.115 -0.028 0.803 -0.786* 0.867 1.042* 1.169* -0.117 
On-cider -0.100 0.071 0.043 0.021 0.365 0.035 -0.591* 0.072 0.237* 0.241 
On-wine -0.197 0.094 -0.154 -0.031 -0.093 -0.276 -0.031 -0.871* -0.021 -0.363 
On-spirits 0.019 -0.117 -0.027 -0.280 -0.145 -0.002 -0.284 0.109 -0.890* 0.809* 
On-RTDs 0.079 0.005 -0.085 -0.047 0.369 0.121 -0.394 -0.027 -0.071 -0.187 
Remarks *: p-value <0.05 
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A comparison of Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 shows that there are substantial differences between the 
two. In particular the cross-price elasticities in the adjusted Irish matrix for on- and off-trade beer 
are very high. For example, a 1% price increase in the price of off-trade beer would result in a 2.23% 
reduction in the consumption of off-trade spirits.  
In light of these issues we consider that the pseudo-panel elasticity estimates presented in Table 4.3 
represent a better estimate of the relationship between price and consumption for the Republic of 
Ireland. Whilst we have attempted to estimate Irish-specific elasticities, the current data do not 
allow this to be done robustly. The impact of using the estimated Irish matrix shown in Table 4.2 is 
tested as a sensitivity analysis in order to explore its effect on the model results. 
4.2.7 Modelling the impact of interventions on price 
 
In order to estimate the impact of a price-based intervention on alcohol consumption it is first 
necessary to estimate the effect of the policy on the beverage-specific price distributions described 
in Section 4.2.4. This is done by applying appropriate assumptions to the adjusted NADS transaction 
data as follows. 
4.2.7.1 Impact of a minimum price on the price distribution 
For each price observation that is below the defined minimum price threshold, the price is inflated 
to the level of the threshold. Note that it is assumed that the applied MUP remains the same in real 
terms over the modelled time frame. 
4.2.7.2 Impact of a ban on ‘below-cost selling’ on the price distribution 
Below-cost selling is assumed to refer to a ban on selling any alcoholic drinks for below the cost of 
duty plus VAT payable on the duty. In practical terms the policy is modelled as being equivalent to 
setting a minimum price equal to duty plus VAT for each beverage type (i.e. any price observations 
below the beverage-specific minimum price are inflated to the level of that threshold). 
Table 4.4 summarises the estimated average duty plus VAT payable on the duty per standard drink 
for beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs in Ireland based on the current duty rates set by Revenue. A 
number of assumptions are used to estimate these thresholds, as: 1) different duty rates exist for 
the same modelled beverage type (e.g. there are currently three duty rates for beer which increase 
with alcohol content), and 2) duty rates for cider and wine are calculated based on product volume 
rather than ethanol content. When multiple duty rates exist (for beer, cider and wine), we choose 
the average duty rate as this is the duty rate which is most widely applied. The ABV7 assumptions for 
cider and wine are based on the those reported in Hope 2009 [7]. The estimated duty plus VAT per 
standard drink is 35.2c, 32.8c, 53.1c, 52.4c and 52.4c for beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs 
respectively. 
 
                                                          
7
 Alcohol by volume, a measure of proportion of pure ethanol within a product.  
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Table 4.4: Method and assumptions to estimate threshold prices under BBCS: estimated duty plus VAT per standard drink for beer, cider, wine, 
spirits and RTDs in Ireland 
Beverage 
type 
Duty rates as set by Revenue, 2013 
(cents) 
Assumed duty rate for 
SAPM3  
Assumed 
average 
ABV for 
wine and 
cider 
Estimated 
duty in 
cents per 
standard 
drink 
Estimated duty plus 
VAT in cents per 
standard drink 
Beer 
0 to 22.21 per hectolitre per cent of alcohol 
in the beer (varies according to ABV: 0.5-
1.2% - no duty, 1.2-2.8% - 11.27, 2.8% or 
more – 22.55) 
€22.55 per hectolitre per cent of 
alcohol in product (2.8% ABV 
or more)   
n/a 28.6 35.2 
Cider 
47.23 to 619.70 per hectolitre of product 
(still and sparkling <2.8% 47.23, 2.8-6% 
94.46, 6%-8.5% - 218.44, still >8.5% - 
309.84, sparkling >8.5% - 619.70) 
€94.46 per hectolitre of product 
(still and sparkling cider with 
ABV between 2.8% and 6.0%) 
4.5% 26.7 32.8 
Wine 
141.57 to 849.68 per hectolitre of product 
(still and sparking <5.5% - 141.57, still 5.5-
15% - 424.84, still >15% - 616.45, 
sparkling >5.5% 849.68) 
€424.84 per hectolitre of 
product (still wine with ABV 
5.5% to 15%) 
12.5% 43.2 53.1 
Spirits 42.57 per hectolitre of pure alcohol 
€42.57 per hectolitre of pure 
alcohol 
n/a 42.6 52.4 
RTDs 
42.57 per hectolitre of pure alcohol (spirits 
based) 
€42.57 per hectolitre of pure 
alcohol (spirits based) 
n/a 42.6 52.4 
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4.2.7.3 Impact of a discount ban on the price distribution 
For each price observation that is at a discounted price, the price is inflated to the corresponding list 
price. Since individual price observations are not defined as promoted or otherwise (rather, this is 
based on separate evidence), some detailed manipulation of the distribution is required as described 
below: 
 For every off-trade price observation (with price P, purchase Volume V and sample weight 
W) for beverage Y: 
o Find the corresponding promotional price range R 
o Look up the proportion of sales of beverage Y in range R that are promoted (0≤d≤1, 
where d=0 indicates zero sales on promotion in this price range and d=1 indicates all 
sales are on promotion in this price range) 
o If d>0, split price observations into two separate observations: {P, d*V, d*W} and {P, 
(1-d)*V, (1-d)*W} 
o For the first observation, look up the conditional distribution of list prices associated 
with promotions at this sales price [cR,…,cn] where n is the total number of price 
ranges, where 0≤ci≤1 with associated multipliers to list price [mR,…,mn]. Split the 
observation into further separate observations if ci>0 
o For each new observation, i, adjust the price P to the minimum permitted price 
P=P*mi 
o Replace the original observation with the new set of observations in the price 
distribution. 
 
4.2.8 Modelling the impact of price on consumption 
 
After adjusting the price distributions as described in Section 4.2.4, the final step to estimating the 
impact of the intervention on alcohol consumption is to apply the price elasticities discussed in 
Section 4.2.6. For each modelled subgroup the impact of the change in prices caused by the policy 
on mean weekly alcohol consumption is estimated using the elasticity matrix described in Table 4.3. 
The formula used to apply the elasticity matrix is shown below: 
%∆𝐶𝑖 = (1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖%∆𝑝𝑖)(1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑗%∆𝑝𝑗) − 1
∀𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖    Equation 1 
where, %∆Ci is the estimated percentage change in consumption for beverage i, eii is the own-
price elasticity for beverage i, %∆pi is the percentage change in price for beverage i, eij is the 
cross-price elasticities for the consumption of beverage i due to a change in the price of 
beverage j, and %∆pj is the percentage change in price for beverage j. 
As described in Section 4.3.4.3, the estimated relative change in weekly consumption for each 
individual is then used to predict the change in drinking patterns for the individual. 
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4.3 MODELLING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSUMPTION AND HARM 
4.3.1 Model structure 
 
An epidemiological approach is used to model the relationship between consumption and harm, 
relating changes in the prevalence of alcohol consumption to changes in prevalence of risk of 
experiencing harmful outcomes. Risk functions relating consumption (however described) to level of 
risk are the fundamental components of the model. 
The ‘consumption to harm’ model considers the impact of consumption on harms in three domains: 
health (including the impact on both mortality and morbidity), crime and the workplace. 
4.3.2 Alcohol-related health conditions 
 
The model aims to capture the policy impact for the large number of health conditions for which 
evidence suggests alcohol plays a contributory role. Table 4.5 presents a list of all included 
conditions, which has been adapted from recent global meta-analyses and burden of disease studies 
[10,11]. These conditions are divided into four categories of attribution: 
1) Wholly attributable (AAF=100%) chronic – meaning that the harm cannot occur in the absence 
of alcohol consumption, and risk of occurrence changes with chronic exposure to alcohol (eg. 
alcoholic liver disease, ICD10 code = K701) 
2) Wholly attributable acute – meaning that the harm cannot occur without alcohol as its cause, 
and risk of occurrence changes with acute exposure to alcohol including intoxication (eg. 
ethanol poisoning, ICD10 code = T51.0) 
3) Partially attributable chronic – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the risk of 
occurrence changes with chronic exposure to alcohol (e.g. malignant neoplasm (cancer) of the 
oesophagus, ICD10 code = C15) 
4) Partially attributable acute – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the risk of 
occurrence changes with acute exposure to alcohol (e.g. falls, ICD10 code = W00-W19, or 
assault, ICD10 = X85-Y09) 
                                                          
1
 Note that HIPE data used in the model was coded using ICD-10-AM-4
th
 Edition (2007 & 2008) and ICD-10-AM 
6
th
 Edition (2009) 
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Table 4.5: Health conditions included in the model 
 Condition ICD-10 Code(s) Source of Risk 
Function 
Wholly 
attributable 
chronic 
conditions 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's 
syndrome 
E24.4 
Apply the PIF method 
based on mean 
consumption 
Degeneration of the nervous 
system 
G31.2 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I42.6 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 
Chronic pancreatitis K86.0 
Wholly 
attributable 
acute 
conditions 
Mental and behavioural disorders 
due to use of alc. 
F10 
Apply the PIF method 
based on peak 
consumption in the 
last week 
Ethanol poisoning T51.0 
Methanol poisoning T51.1 
Toxic effect of alcohol, other T51.2-T51.9 
Accidental poisoning by exposure 
to alcohol (incl. ‘undetermined 
intent’) 
X45, Y15 
Excessive blood level of alcohol R78.0 
Partially 
attributable 
chronic 
conditions 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral 
cavity and pharynx 
C00-C14 [12] 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 
[13] 
Malignant neoplasm of colon C18 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum C20 
Malig. neoplasm of liver and 
intrahepatic bile ducts 
C22 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 [14] 
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 [15] 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) E11 [16] 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 [17] 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 
[13] 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 
Cardiac arrhythmias I47-I48 [18] 
Haemorrhagic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 
[13] Ischaemic stroke I66,I69.3, I69.4 
Oesophageal varices  I85 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-
haemorrhage synd. 
K22.6 [19] 
Unspecified liver disease K73, K74 [13] 
Cholelithiasis K80 [16] 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis K85, K86.1 [13] 
Psoriasis L40 excludes L40.5 
[16] 
Spontaneous abortion O03 
Partially 
attributable 
acute 
conditions 
Road traffic accidents - non 
pedestrian 
V12-14, V19.4-V19.6, V19.9, 
V20-V28, V29-V79, V80.3-V80.5, 
V81.1, V82.1, V83-V86, V87.0-
V87.9, V89.2, V89.3, V89.9 
New method based on 
Taylor et al. [23], 
described in Section 
4.3.4.3. 
Pedestrian traffic accidents V02-V04, V06.1, V09.2, V09.3 
Water transport accidents V90-V94 
Air/space transport accidents V95-V97 
Fall injuries W00-W19 
Work/machine injuries W24-W31 
Firearm injuries W32-W34 
Drowning W65-W74 
Inhalation of gastric contents W78 
Fire injuries X00-X09 
Accidental excessive cold X31 
Intentional self-harm X60-X84 
Assault X85-Y09 
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4.3.3 Alcohol-attributable fractions and potential impact fractions 
 
The methodology is similar to that used in Gunning-Scheper’s Prevent model [20], being based on 
the notion of the alcohol-attributable fraction (AAF) and its more general form, the potential impact 
fraction (PIF). 
The AAF of a disease can be defined as the difference between the overall average risk (or incidence 
rate) of the disease in the entire population (drinkers and never-drinkers) and the average risk in 
those without the exposure factor under investigation (never-drinkers), expressed as a fraction of 
the overall average risk. For example, the AAF for female breast cancer is simply the risk of breast 
cancer in the total female population minus the risk of breast cancer in women who have never 
drank alcohol, divided by the breast cancer risk for the total female population. Thus, AAFs are used 
as a measure of the proportion of the disease that is attributable to alcohol. While this approach has 
traditionally been used for chronic health-related outcomes, it can in principle be applied to other 
harms (including those outside of the health domain). 
The AAF can be calculated using the following formula: 
  Equation 2 
where, RRi is the relative risk (RR) due to exposure to alcohol at consumption state i, pi is the 
proportion of the population exposed to alcohol at consumption state i, and n is the number 
of consumption states. 
If the reference category is abstention from alcohol then the AAF describes the proportion of 
outcomes that would not have occurred if everyone in the population had abstained from drinking. 
Thus, the numerator is essentially the excess expected cases due to alcohol exposure and the 
denominator is the total expected cases. In situations where certain levels of alcohol consumption 
reduce the risk of an outcome (e.g. coronary heart disease) the AAF can be negative and would 
describe the additional cases that would have occurred if everyone was an abstainer. 
Note that there are methodological difficulties with AAF studies. One problem is in defining the non-
exposed group – in one sense ‘never drinkers’ are the only correct non-exposed group, but they are 
rare and usually quite different from the general population in various respects. However, current 
non-drinkers include those who were heavy drinkers in the past (and these remain a high-risk group, 
especially if they have given up due to alcohol-related health problems). Several studies show that 
findings of avoided coronary heart disease risk may be based on systematic errors in the way 
abstainers were defined in the underlying studies [21]. 
The PIF is a generalisation of the AAF based on arbitrary changes to the prevalence of alcohol 
consumption (rather than assuming all drinkers become abstainers). Note that a lag may exist 
between the exposure to alcohol and the resulting change in risk. The PIF can be calculated using the 
following formula: 
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      Equation 3 
where 𝑝𝑖  is the modified prevalence for consumption state i and state 0 corresponds to 
abstention. 
In the model, alcohol consumption in a population subgroup is described non-parametrically by the 
associated observations from the NADS. For any high risk outcome, risk levels are associated with 
consumption level for each of the observations (note that these are not person-level risk functions). 
The associated prevalence for the observation is simply defined by its sample weight from the 
survey. Therefore, the PIF is implemented in the model as: 
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      Equation 4 
where wi is the weight for observation i, 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the modified risk for the new consumption 
level and N is the number of samples. 
4.3.4 Applying potential impact fractions 
 
The impact of a change in consumption on health harms was examined using the potential impact 
fraction framework and by three different methods for implementation: 
1. Direct application of consumption measures to calculate potential impact fractions for 
wholly attributable chronic and acute health conditions.  
2. Relative risk functions from the published literature for partial chronic conditions. 
3. Relative risk functions from the published literature and derived individual annualised 
risk for partial acute conditions. 
4.3.4.1 Wholly attributable chronic and acute conditions 
Wholly attributable chronic and acute conditions, by definition, have AAF=1 and no relative risk 
function can be defined since reference group has no risk. In order to apply the potential impact 
fraction, relative risk in Equation 3 is replaced with alcohol consumption that is likely to lead to 
increased risk for the health condition, denoted by RiskAlci. For wholly attributable chronic 
conditions, RiskAlci is defined as the difference between mean daily consumption and recommended 
daily consumption in Ireland (2.43/1.57 standard drinks for men/women [26]) or 0 if mean daily 
consumption is below the threshold. For wholly attributable acute conditions, RiskAlci is defined as 
the imputed heavy singe occasion drinking measure, i.e., number of heavy drinking occasions in a 
week.  
4.3.4.2 Partially attributable chronic conditions 
The relative risk functions for all chronic conditions that are partially attributable to alcohol are 
taken from published meta-analyses and used in Equation 3. Table 4.5 gives the sources for these 
risk functions.  
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4.3.4.3 Partially attributable acute conditions 
Partially attributable acute conditions include various traffic and non-traffic injuries. The identified 
relative risk functions for these conditions are different from the relative risk functions for partially 
attributable chronic conditions and cannot be used directly in Equation 2. The input and outcome of 
the relative risk functions for partially attributable chronic conditions are usual alcohol consumption 
and relative risk over a certain period of time; however, the input and outcome of the identified 
relative risk functions for traffic and non-traffic injuries are levels of drinking occasion prior to the 
injury and the relative risk for the drinking occasion [23]. As SAPM3 works on annual cycles, relative 
risk in Equation 2 is defined as annual relative risk. Therefore, to apply Equation 2 single drinking 
occasion based relative risk needs to be converted to long-term (e.g. annual) relative risk of a 
surveyed individual.  
A new method to estimate annualised relative risk of alcohol affected traffic and non-traffic injuries 
has been developed. Briefly, three measures are defined to represent drinking patterns based on 
single drinking occasions which are:  1) the frequency of drinking occasions (defined as n, or number 
of drinking occasions per week), 2) the mean level of alcohol consumption for a given drinking 
occasion (defined as 𝜇, or standard drinks of alcohol) and 3) the variability of alcohol consumption 
for a given drinking occasion (defined as 𝜎, or standard deviation of standard drinks of alcohol 
consumed in drinking occasions). Using the weekly drinking diary data, regression models were 
fitted to relate the three measures with mean consumption and a range of independent variables 
(e.g. age, gender, education, ethnicity, etc.). These regression models are used to impute the three 
measures for each individual in the NADS. For each individual, alcohol consumption on a given 
drinking occasion is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a mean of 𝜇 and standard 
deviation of 𝜎; the duration of intoxication for a given drinking occasion is calculated by applying the 
equation for estimating blood alcohol content. Finally, a series of integrations was performed to 
calculate the annualised relative risk for traffic and non-traffic accidents. Detailed description of the 
method can be found elsewhere [24]. The annualised relative risk is used in Equation 4 to estimate 
the potential impact factor for partially attributable acute conditions. 
 
4.4 CONSUMPTION TO HEALTH HARMS MODEL 
4.4.1 Mortality model structure 
 
A simplified version of the model structure for mortality is presented in Figure 4.14.The model is 
developed to represent the population of Ireland in a life table. Separate life tables have been 
implemented for males and females. 
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Figure 4.14: Simplified mortality model structure 
  
The life table is implemented as a linked set of simple Markov models with individuals of age a 
transitioning between two states – alive and dead – at model time step t. Those of age a still alive 
after the transition then form the initial population for age a+1 at time t+1 and the sequence 
repeats. 
The transition probabilities from the alive to dead state are broken down by condition and are 
individually modified via potential impact fractions over time t, where the PIF essentially varies with 
consumption over time: 
                           Equation 5 
where PIFt is the potential impact fraction relating to consumption at time t, i = NADS sample 
number, N = number of samples in subgroup i, RRi,t is the risk relating to the consumption of 
NADS sample i at time t, RRi,0 is the risk at baseline, and wi is the weight of sample i. 
Note that the PIF can be decomposed to enable different population groups at baseline – for 
example, low risk, increasing risk and high risk drinkers and drinker in poverty and not in poverty – to 
be followed separately over the course of the model. 
The model computes mortality results for two separate scenarios (a baseline – implemented as ‘no 
change to consumption’ in the analysis herein – and an intervention). The effect of the intervention 
is then calculated as the difference between the life tables of two scenarios: enabling the change in 
the total expected deaths attributable to alcohol due to the policy to be estimated. 
Outcomes from the mortality modelling are expressed in terms of life years saved. Morbidity 
valuation is the purpose of a second model described below. 
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4.4.2 Morbidity model structure 
 
A simplified schematic of the morbidity model is shown in Figure 4.15. The model focuses on the 
expected disease prevalence for population cohorts. Note that if an incidence-based approach were 
used instead, then much more detailed modelling of survival time, cure rates, death rates and 
possibly disease progression for each disease for each population subgroup would be needed. 
 Figure 4.15: Simplified structure of the morbidity model 
 
The morbidity model works by partitioning the alive population at time t, rather than using a 
transition approach between states as previously described for the mortality model. Alive individuals 
are partitioned between all 48 alcohol-related conditions (and a 49th condition representing overall 
population health, not attributable to alcohol). 
As in the mortality model, the PIF is calculated based on the consumption distribution at time 0 and 
t. The PIF is then used to modify the partition rate (i.e. the distribution of the 48 conditions for alive 
individuals) to produce person-specific sickness volumes. These volumes then form the basis for 
estimating both health service costs and health related quality of life. 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) are examined using the difference in health-related quality of life 
(utility) in individuals with alcohol health harms and the quality of life measured in the general 
population (or “normal health”). Utility scores usually range between 1 (perfect health) and 0 (a 
state equivalent to death), though it is possible for some extreme conditions to be valued as worse 
than death. The utility scores are an expression of societal preference for health states with several 
different methods available to estimate them. Note that because a life table approach has been 
adopted, the method to estimate QALY change for morbidity also encompasses the mortality 
valuation. 
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4.4.3 Time lag effects for chronic harms 
 
When modelling the link between consumption and harm, one important input is the assumption 
surrounding the ‘time lag’ – the time needed to achieve the full benefit (reduction in harms) 
associated with a reduction of consumption. Such data is necessary for chronic conditions where the 
development of a disease often occurs over many years.  
Following a recent systematic review by members of the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group [25], 
SAPM3 incorporates new lag structures for all chronic harms based on the best available published 
evidence to estimate the temporal relationship between changes in consumption and changes in risk 
of harm. The full lag structures as implemented in the model are presented in Appendix A. 
4.4.4 Mortality model parameters 
 
Baseline population data, used to populate the initial life tables described in Section 4.4.1 for 
Ireland, was obtained from the CSO’s population estimates for 2011. Age and gender subgroup-
specific mortality rates for each of the 48 modelled health conditions as well as all-cause mortality 
were calculated by the HRB for 2007-2011. For 100% alcohol-attributable conditions these rates 
were derived from the National Drug Related Death Index. Data for all other conditions came from 
the General Mortality Register. These rates were then apportioned between income categories using 
income gradients for morbidity calculated for Northern Ireland as no equivalent data could be 
identified for the Republic of Ireland.  
4.4.5 Morbidity model parameters 
4.4.5.1 Life table data 
As for the mortality model, the baseline population for the morbidity life table was derived from CSO 
data. 
4.4.5.2 Morbidity prevalence rates 
Morbidity data for Ireland was derived by the HRB from Hospital In-Patient Enquiry (HIPE) data for 
2007-2011. This data consisted of anonymised, individual discharge level data containing all relevant 
diagnoses associated with the discharge. All discharges including at least one alcohol-related 
diagnosis were included in the analysis. Where more than one alcohol-related diagnosis was present 
for a single discharge9, the discharge was allocated to the diagnosis with the highest level of alcohol 
attribution (following a process previously described by the North West Public Health Observatory 
(NWPHO) who performed similar analyses on English data[26]). It was not possible to identify repeat 
discharges for the same individual in this data and so the relationship between hospital discharges 
and population prevalence of each health condition was estimated using Northern Irish data. This 
data was considered the most appropriate as the Northern Irish health service is the most similar to 
Ireland of those countries for whom such data could be identified, and comparison of international 
data suggests that these relationships are relatively stable between different healthcare systems. 
The resulting ‘multipliers’, which represent the mean number of discharges in a year for a person 
with each of the modelled health conditions, are presented in Table 4.6 and were used to estimate 
                                                          
9
 Hospital discharges in Ireland can be allocated multiple diagnoses, more details can be found in the Irish 
Coding Standards [37] 
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the annual morbidity for each condition. As no specific data on the socioeconomic gradient in 
alcohol-related disease prevalence by health condition could be identified for Ireland, the estimated 
annual morbidity prevalence was apportioned between in poverty and not in poverty groups using 
equivalent data for Northern Ireland. This data is the most appropriate available as both countries 
have relatively similar demography and patterns of drinking and, crucially, utilise the same definition 
for poverty, making it highly likely that the socioeconomic gradient in disease prevalence is 
comparable. 
Average costs for a hospital discharge for each of the 48 modelled health conditions were provided 
by analysts at HIPE, using the same procedure to attribute discharges to each condition as was 
followed for the morbidity data. This data was available for 2012 only, in which year there were no 
discharges for alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing’s syndrome or methanol poisoning. Costs for these 
conditions were therefore estimated to be the same as for ethanol poisoning as previous cost 
estimates for both conditions for England and Northern Ireland have found them to be comparable. 
Table 4.6 presents the baseline morbidity parameters used in the model. 
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Table 4.6: Morbidity model parameters estimated from HIPE data 
Condition Multiplier
10
 
Estimated Annual Morbidity Mean Cost 
per 
Morbidity 
Total Cost per 
annum to 
Health Service 
In Poverty        
(N (%)) 
Not In Poverty 
(N (%)) 
Total 
(N) 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-
Cushing's syndrome 
1.00 0 (16%) 0 (84%) 0 €3,097 €664 
Degeneration of the nervous 
system 
1.28 11 (19%) 46 (81%) 57 €21,016 €1,207,899 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy 1.24 2 (21%) 9 (79%) 12 €9,694 €114,415 
Alcoholic myopathy 1.00 1 (20%) 6 (80%) 7 €38,087 €266,399 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 1.19 19 (19%) 78 (81%) 96 €8,684 €836,418 
Alcoholic gastritis 1.09 55 (23%) 183 (77%) 237 €3,260 €773,989 
Alcoholic liver disease 1.85 305 (21%) 1172 (79%) 1477 €16,993 €25,099,549 
Chronic pancreatitis 1.37 45 (23%) 152 (77%) 197 €8,463 €1,667,843 
Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to use of alc. 
1.46 1914 (22%) 6915 (78%) 8829 €9,722 €85,835,975 
Ethanol poisoning 1.10 89 (24%) 276 (76%) 365 €3,097 €1,130,278 
Methanol poisoning 1.00 0 (26%) 1 (74%) 1 €3,097 €3,858 
Toxic effect of alcohol, other 1.05 38 (24%) 118 (76%) 156 €4,560 €711,915 
Accidental poisoning by 
exposure to alcohol (incl. 
‘undetermined intent’) 
1.00 1 (23%) 5 (77%) 6 €3,675 €23,137 
Excessive blood level of 
alcohol 
1.00 3 (20%) 12 (80%) 16 €2,182 €34,146 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, 
oral cavity and pharynx 
2.19 480 (19%) 2037 (81%) 2517 €5,246 €13,207,100 
Malignant neoplasm of 
oesophagus 
3.53 231 (18%) 1063 (82%) 1295 €8,986 €11,635,591 
Malignant neoplasm of colon 3.89 764 (18%) 3469 (82%) 4233 €11,673 €49,414,250 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum 3.82 527 (18%) 2371 (82%) 2898 €7,758 €22,486,171 
Malig. neoplasm of liver and 
intrahepatic bile ducts 
3.01 59 (18%) 267 (82%) 326 €14,434 €4,701,055 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx 1.90 245 (18%) 1132 (82%) 1377 €5,965 €8,214,114 
Malignant neoplasm of breast 4.24 2879 (19%) 11890 (81%) 14770 €5,184 €76,569,725 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) 1.42 3195 (18%) 14754 (82%) 17948 €6,314 €113,317,529 
Epilepsy and status 
epilepticus 
1.51 828 (22%) 2991 (78%) 3820 €7,668 €29,291,155 
Hypertensive diseases 1.51 8914 (18%) 40708 (82%) 49623 €7,711 €382,647,309 
Ischaemic heart disease 1.42 2633 (18%) 11993 (82%) 14626 €8,435 €123,373,417 
Cardiac arrhythmias 1.54 4207 (17%) 20119 (83%) 24326 €11,886 €289,139,037 
Haemorrhagic stroke 1.77 184 (19%) 781 (81%) 965 €24,625 €23,771,362 
Ischaemic stroke 1.74 78 (18%) 362 (82%) 440 €18,008 €7,931,347 
Oesophageal varices  1.39 91 (20%) 361 (80%) 452 €6,867 €3,103,740 
Gastro-oesophageal 
laceration-haemorrhage synd. 
1.04 36 (21%) 136 (79%) 172 €6,234 €1,073,018 
Unspecified liver disease 1.77 121 (20%) 485 (80%) 605 €12,992 €7,866,412 
Cholelithiasis 1.26 1362 (21%) 5270 (79%) 6633 €6,226 €41,295,013 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 1.32 296 (21%) 1114 (79%) 1411 €9,059 €12,778,271 
Psoriasis 1.35 2985 (23%) 9962 (77%) 12948 €1,057 €13,689,540 
Spontaneous abortion 1.03 1249 (24%) 3977 (76%) 5226 €858 €4,486,106 
Road traffic accidents - non 
pedestrian 
1.03 841 (25%) 2584 (75%) 3426 €6,281 €21,515,396 
Pedestrian traffic accidents 1.04 89 (22%) 309 (78%) 397 €8,283 €3,292,155 
Water transport accidents 1.03 10 (24%) 31 (76%) 41 €5,351 €216,832 
Air/space transport accidents 1.12 3 (24%) 11 (76%) 14 €9,785 €137,089 
Fall injuries 1.04 3446 (20%) 13496 (80%) 16943 €6,752 €114,400,008 
Work/machine injuries 1.01 480 (25%) 1463 (75%) 1944 €3,008 €5,847,156 
Firearm injuries 1.00 9 (26%) 26 (74%) 34 €3,785 €130,530 
Drowning 1.00 3 (23%) 10 (77%) 13 €4,444 €56,736 
Inhalation of gastric contents 1.05 2 (18%) 10 (82%) 13 €34,433 €433,913 
Fire injuries 1.02 47 (22%) 166 (78%) 214 €10,602 €2,264,657 
Accidental excessive cold 1.00 4 (18%) 20 (82%) 24 €8,563 €204,503 
Intentional self-harm 1.13 464 (25%) 1427 (75%) 1891 €3,777 €7,141,649 
Assault 1.04 630 (26%) 1766 (74%) 2396 €3,501 €8,389,765 
                                                          
10
 Mean no. of admissions per year for a person with the condition – see Section 4.4.5.2 for details 
43 
 
4.4.5.3 Health related quality of life 
Utilities for all 48 conditions included in the model were derived from a single source, the Health 
Outcomes Data Repository (HODaR) [27], to avoid potential bias and variability between studies. The 
HODaR data measures utilities using the EQ-5D, a widely used generic (disease non-specific) quality 
of life instrument as recommended by Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) for health 
economic evaluation [31]. Full details of the methodology for deriving these utilities has been 
described elsewhere [1]. 
4.4.5.4 Valuation of Health Harms and Discounting 
In this analysis QALYs and costs were discounted at 3.5% annually. All costs are presented in 2013 
prices. 
 
4.5 CONSUMPTION TO CRIME HARMS MODEL 
4.5.1 Summary of crime model structure 
 
The model examines the impact of changes in alcohol consumption on rates and associated costs for 
15 crime categories listed in Table 4.8. 
A simplified schematic of the crime model is shown in Figure 4.16. As for the health model, the main 
mechanism is the PIF, which is calculated based on the consumption distribution at time 0 and time t 
and an estimated risk function. The PIF is then applied directly to the baseline number of offences to 
give a new volume of crime for time t. The model uses the consumption distribution for the intake 
on the heaviest drinking day in the past week (peak consumption) since crime is assumed to be a 
consequence of acute drinking rather than mean drinking and consequently there is no time delay 
between change in exposure to alcohol and subsequent change in risk of committing a crime. 
Figure 4.16: Simplified structure of the crime model 
 
Outcomes are presented in terms of the number of offences and the associated cost of crime. The 
outcomes from the ‘do nothing’ and the policy scenario are then compared to estimate the 
incremental effect of the implementation of the policy. 
 
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t1
PIF estimate t=t1
Modified crime 
volume t=t1
Relative risk 
function
Baseline crime 
volume t=0
QALY impact
QALY estimate 
t=t1
Cost estimate t=t1 Unit costs
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In this analysis, loss of QALYs for crime victims is set to zero as the related cost is embedded within 
the estimated financial costs of crime. 
4.5.2 Baseline volumes of crime 
 
Baseline data on the number of recorded offences for a range of crime categories is published by the 
CSO, with 2012 the latest year for which data is available. However, this data is not available broken 
down by the age and/or gender of the offender. In order to apportion the volumes of recorded 
crime between age-gender subgroups in the model, we use data on convictions for the period 
between 2003 to 2012 also available from CSO. This data is split by gender and four age groups (18<, 
18-24, 25-44, 45+, however, these age bands do not align with those used in the model (18-24, 25-
34, 35-54, 55-75). To this end, an exercise was undertaken to apportion the CSO conviction data to 
align with the age groups used by the model. This distribution is then used to estimate the volumes 
of recorded crime committed within each age-gender subgroup under the assumption that the 
distribution of offenders is the same as the distribution of those convicted of each offence. 
While the CSO data covers recorded crime, the total number of offences committed is likely to be 
substantially higher. As part of the quarterly National Household Survey, data is periodically 
collected on reporting rates for various categories of crime. These rates provide a multiplier which 
relates the number of recorded offences to the number of actual offences estimated to have been 
committed for various different crime categories. Table 4.7 presents these multipliers for 2006, the 
most recent estimates available.  These multipliers are matched to the Irish crime categories in order 
to estimate the total baseline volumes of each crime. Table 4.8 presents the estimated volumes for 
each crime category in the model together with the estimated costs of each crime. No estimates of 
the unit costs of crime could be identified for Ireland; however, a report from 2007 estimated a total 
cost to the nation of crime of €1.19bn. A similar report for the UK estimated a cost of €11.9bn in 
2001/02. Converting these prices to a common currency and year and adjusting for the relative 
population differences suggests that the per capita cost of crime in Ireland is 79% of that in the UK. 
This adjustment factor is applied to UK Home Office estimates of unit crime costs [28] in order to 
estimate Irish unit costs. 
Table 4.7: Multipliers relating recorded crime volumes to estimated actual volumes 
Type of Crime 2006 Multiplier 
Burglaries 1.43 
Theft of vehicle 1.08 
Theft from vehicle 1.72 
Vandalism 2.33 
Theft of bicycle 2.48 
Violent theft 1.63 
Non-violent theft 1.92 
Assault 1.90 
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Table 4.8: Baseline crime volumes 
Crime category Recorded 
Volume 
Multiplier Estimated 
Total 
Volume 
Costs 
Assault causing harm 3,231 1.90 6,143 €8,510 
Assault or obstruction of Garda/official, 
resisting arrest 
330 1.90 627 €1,666 
Minor assault 10,006 1.90 19,023 €1,666 
Criminal damage 32,146 2.33 74,932 €1,666 
Robbery from the person 1,614 1.92 3,098 €1,002 
Robbery (other) 1,065 1.92 2,044 €8,386 
Burglary 28,133 1.43 40,133 €8,921 
Theft from person 5,036 1.92 9,666 €3,736 
Theft/Unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle 5,477 2.48 13,591 €4,386 
Theft from vehicle 14,484 1.72 24,929 €726 
Theft/Taking of vehicle and related offences 8,448 1.08 9,163 €726 
Theft from shop 19,584 1.92 37,589 €984 
Theft (other) 21,778 1.92 41,800 €4,731 
Sexual offences 2,117 13.60 28,791 €4,731 
Murder 53 1.00 53 €118 
 
4.5.3 Crime risk function parameters 
 
Prevalence-based risk modelling is not as well developed for crime as for chronic health conditions. 
Risk functions for crime harms are not generally available in the literature and need to be estimated 
using Alcohol-Attributable Fractions (AAFs), which represent the proportion of offences which would 
not have occurred in the absence of alcohol. AAFs have previously been estimated for the UK from 
the Offending Crime and Justice Survey using a methodology described elsewhere [1]. These AAFs 
are matched to the Irish crime categories and risk functions fitted for each age-gender subgroup 
using data on peak consumption. 
The AAF evidence can be used to derive a relative risk function assuming the relationship described 
in Equation 2, since the AAF is a positive function of the prevalence of drinking and the relative risk 
function. 
Two assumptions are necessary to compute a relative function from an AAF: assumptions about the 
form of the curve (or risk function) and assumptions about the threshold below which the relative 
risk is unity (i.e. harm is not associated with alcohol). Linear functions were selected for the present 
analyses due to the lack of data in the literature. For acute harms partially attributable to alcohol, a 
threshold of 2.43/1.57 standard drinks for men/women was chosen – corresponding to Irish low-risk 
drinking guidelines of 17/11 std. drinks per week [22]. 
The resulting relative risk functions are therefore a function of consumption (for which a slope is 
defined) and threshold as follows: 
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𝑅𝑅(𝑐) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 < 𝑇 
𝑅𝑅(𝑐) = 𝛽 (𝑐 − 𝑇) + 1  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    Equation 6 
where c = peak day consumption, T = threshold and β=slope parameter. 
An example of a linear function constructed from an AAF is shown in Figure 4.17. 
Figure 4.17: Illustrative linear relative risk function for a partially attributable acute harm 
(threshold of 2.43 standard drinks) 
 
 
4.6 CONSUMPTION TO WORKPLACE HARMS MODEL 
4.6.1 Summary of workplace model structure 
 
A simplified schematic of the workplace model is shown in Figure 4.18. Based on baseline 
consumption, consumption at time t and risk functions derived above, a PIF is calculated and applied 
to the absence rate. Absenteeism is assumed to be related to acute drinking and so maximum daily 
intake is applied as the consumption measure and it is assumed that there is no time delay between 
change in exposure to alcohol and subsequent change in risk of absenteeism. 
 
4.6.2 Baseline absence data 
 
Data on the number of scheduled workdays per week was taken from the UK Labour Force Survey as 
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estimate the total absence rates for each age-gender subgroup. Data from the EU-SILC survey was 
used to derive the working population and mean gross income for each subgroup. 
Outcomes for two scenarios – do nothing and policy implementation – are computed separately. The 
difference is then taken to estimate the incremental effect of the policy. 
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Figure 4.18: Simplified structure of the workplace model 
 
4.6.3 Workplace risk function parameters 
 
Data from the NADS survey asking about the total number of absent days from work in the past year 
and the number of days absent from work in the past year due to alcohol was used to calculate an 
AAF for absenteeism by age-gender subgroup. These are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: AAFs for absenteeism calculated from NADS data 
 Male Female 
18-24 0.36 0.33 
25-34 0.23 0.09 
35-54 0.08 0.04 
55+ 0.10 0.00 
 
Relative risk functions, derived from the AAFs using the same method for calculating crime risk 
functions (see Section 4.5.3), were calculated for each age-gender group using age-gender specific 
distributions of peak day alcohol consumption from the NADS.  
 
4.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Best practice for policy modelling suggests reporting a single base case estimate, supported by a 
range of sensitivity analyses in order to explore the impact of key uncertainties in the evidence base 
[29]. This approach is focused on the uncertainty around the price elasticities described in Section 
4.2.6, as they are the key active ingredient in the appraisal of pricing policies. In addition to testing 
the alternative elasticity estimates derived from the NADS data, a range of alternative estimates 
around the base case pseudo-panel elasticities are examined: 
 
Consumption t=0 Consumption t=t
1
PIF estimate t=t
1
Relative risk 
function
Modified absence 
rate t=t
1
Baseline 
absence rate t=0
Absent t=t
1
Cost estimate 
t=t
1
49 
 
1) NADS-derived elasticities as described in Section 4.2.6 (SA1) 
2) All cross-price elasticities in the base case elasticity matrix are assumed to be zero (i.e. there 
is no cross-price effect between beverages) (SA2) 
3) All non-significant elasticities (p-value greater than 0.05) in the base case elasticity matrix 
are assumed to be zero (SA3) 
4) Separate low risk - and increasing risk/high risk- specific elasticity matrices, estimated from 
the UK pseudo-panel data (see Meng et al. 2014 for details [5]) (SA4).  
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5 RESULTS 
 
This section contains model results for 21 different pricing policies: 
 a general 10% price increase on all alcohol products in both the on- and off-trade  
 MUP policies at 40c, 50c, 60c, 70c, 80c, 90c, 100c, 110c and 120c  
 a ban on below-cost selling  
 a ban on all price-based off-trade promotions  
 a ban on promotions in tandem with each of the modelled MUP policies. 
 
5.1 SUMMARY RESULTS FOR ALL POLICIES 
5.1.1 Impact on alcohol consumption 
 
The impacts on consumption across all modelled policies are shown for the total population and 
population subgroups in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show relative and 
absolute changes in consumption across all individual policies (i.e. excluding policies which combine 
MUP with a promotion ban) by drinker type, whilst Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 illustrates the drinker 
group- and  income-specific impacts of different MUP thresholds. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of estimated effects of pricing policies on alcohol consumption – absolute and % change in consumption per drinker 
Change in consumption per drinker per week (std. drinks (%)) 
  Population Male Female Low risk Increasing  risk High risk In Poverty Not in Poverty 
Population size 3,551,435 1,762,437 1,788,998 2,784,491 582,424 184,520 670,889 2,880,546 
% abstainers 22.1% 20.5% 23.7% 28.2% 0.0% 0.0% 29.8% 20.3% 
Drinker population 2,766,183 1,401,541 1,364,642 1,999,240 582,424 184,520 471,295 2,294,888 
Baseline consumption per person 9.4 12.8 6.0 3.2 21.9 62.5 8.9 9.5 
Baseline consumption per drinker 12.0 16.1 7.9 4.5 21.9 62.5 12.7 11.9 
  
General price + 10% -0.7 (-5.8%) -1.2 (-7.1%) -0.2 (-2.9%) -0.2 (-5.1%) -1.3 (-5.9%) -3.8 (-6%) -0.6 (-5%) -0.7 (-5.9%) 
40c MUP 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
50c MUP 0 (-0.2%) 0 (-0.2%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) -0.2 (-0.4%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (-0.2%) 
60c MUP -0.1 (-0.7%) -0.2 (-1%) 0 (-0.3%) 0 (-0.1%) -0.1 (-0.6%) -0.9 (-1.4%) -0.1 (-0.6%) -0.1 (-0.8%) 
70c MUP -0.2 (-1.9%) -0.4 (-2.4%) -0.1 (-0.8%) 0 (-0.3%) -0.3 (-1.6%) -2.1 (-3.4%) -0.3 (-2.4%) -0.2 (-1.7%) 
80c MUP -0.5 (-3.8%) -0.8 (-4.8%) -0.1 (-1.8%) 0 (-0.9%) -0.7 (-3.2%) -4.3 (-6.8%) -0.7 (-5.3%) -0.4 (-3.5%) 
90c MUP -0.7 (-6.2%) -1.2 (-7.6%) -0.3 (-3.2%) -0.1 (-1.9%) -1.1 (-5.1%) -6.7 (-10.7%) -1.1 (-8.7%) -0.7 (-5.6%) 
100c MUP -1.1 (-8.8%) -1.7 (-10.7%) -0.4 (-4.9%) -0.1 (-3.1%) -1.6 (-7.2%) -9.5 (-15.1%) -1.6 (-12.3%) -1 (-8.1%) 
110c MUP -1.4 (-11.7%) -2.3 (-14.1%) -0.5 (-6.7%) -0.2 (-4.5%) -2.1 (-9.4%) -12.4 (-19.8%) -2.1 (-16.1%) -1.3 (-10.7%) 
120c MUP -1.8 (-14.6%) -2.8 (-17.4%) -0.7 (-8.6%) -0.3 (-6.1%) -2.6 (-11.7%) -15.3 (-24.4%) -2.5 (-19.8%) -1.6 (-13.4%) 
Ban on below-cost selling 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 
Promotion ban -0.2 (-1.8%) -0.4 (-2.2%) -0.1 (-0.8%) 0 (-0.7%) -0.3 (-1.4%) -1.9 (-3%) -0.3 (-2.6%) -0.2 (-1.6%) 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -0.2 (-1.8%) -0.4 (-2.2%) -0.1 (-0.9%) 0 (-0.7%) -0.3 (-1.4%) -1.9 (-3%) -0.3 (-2.5%) -0.2 (-1.6%) 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -0.2 (-1.8%) -0.4 (-2.2%) -0.1 (-0.9%) 0 (-0.6%) -0.3 (-1.4%) -2 (-3.1%) -0.3 (-2.6%) -0.2 (-1.6%) 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -0.3 (-2.3%) -0.5 (-2.8%) -0.1 (-1.2%) 0 (-0.7%) -0.4 (-2%) -2.5 (-4%) -0.3 (-2.7%) -0.3 (-2.2%) 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -0.3 (-2.6%) -0.5 (-3.2%) -0.1 (-1.4%) 0 (-0.4%) -0.5 (-2.4%) -2.9 (-4.6%) -0.4 (-3.5%) -0.3 (-2.4%) 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -0.6 (-5.1%) -1 (-6.1%) -0.2 (-3.1%) -0.1 (-1.6%) -1 (-4.4%) -5.4 (-8.6%) -0.9 (-6.7%) -0.6 (-4.7%) 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -0.9 (-7.1%) -1.4 (-8.6%) -0.3 (-4%) -0.1 (-2.5%) -1.3 (-6%) -7.5 (-12%) -1.2 (-9.6%) -0.8 (-6.6%) 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -1.1 (-9.4%) -1.8 (-11.3%) -0.4 (-5.3%) -0.2 (-3.5%) -1.7 (-7.7%) -9.9 (-15.9%) -1.6 (-12.8%) -1 (-8.6%) 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -1.4 (-11.7%) -2.3 (-14.1%) -0.5 (-6.7%) -0.2 (-4.5%) -2.1 (-9.4%) -12.4 (-19.8%) -2.1 (-16.1%) -1.3 (-10.7%) 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -1.8 (-14.6%) -2.8 (-17.4%) -0.7 (-8.6%) -0.3 (-6.1%) -2.6 (-11.7%) -15.3 (-24.4%) -2.5 (-19.8%) -1.6 (-13.4%) 
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Table 5.2: Summary of estimated effects on alcohol consumption by income and drinker group 
Change in consumption per drinker per week (std. drinks (%)) 
  Low risk Increasing risk High risk 
  In poverty Not in poverty In poverty Not in poverty In poverty Not in poverty 
Population size 544,638 2,239,854 90,629 491,795 35,623 148,897 
% abstainers 36.6% 26.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Drinker population 345,044 1,654,196 90,629 491,795 35,623 148,897 
Baseline consumption per person 2.6 3.4 21.1 22.0 75.3 59.5 
Baseline consumption per drinker 4.1 4.6 21.1 22.0 75.3 59.5 
 
General price + 10% -0.2 (-5.1%) -0.2 (-5.1%) -0.9 (-4.2%) -1.4 (-6.3%) -4.1 (-5.4%) -3.7 (-6.2%) 
40c MUP 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 
50c MUP 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) -0.2 (-0.3%) -0.2 (-0.4%) 
60c MUP 0 (-0.7%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.2%) -0.2 (-0.7%) -0.7 (-0.9%) -0.9 (-1.5%) 
70c MUP -0.1 (-2.3%) 0 (0.1%) -0.4 (-1.7%) -0.3 (-1.6%) -2.2 (-2.9%) -2.1 (-3.5%) 
80c MUP -0.2 (-5.2%) 0 (-0.1%) -0.9 (-4.3%) -0.7 (-3%) -4.5 (-6%) -4.2 (-7%) 
90c MUP -0.3 (-8.6%) 0 (-0.6%) -1.5 (-7.3%) -1 (-4.7%) -7.4 (-9.8%) -6.6 (-11%) 
100c MUP -0.5 (-12%) -0.1 (-1.4%) -2.2 (-10.4%) -1.5 (-6.6%) -10.4 (-13.8%) -9.3 (-15.5%) 
110c MUP -0.6 (-15.5%) -0.1 (-2.5%) -2.8 (-13.5%) -1.9 (-8.7%) -13.8 (-18.2%) -12.1 (-20.3%) 
120c MUP -0.8 (-18.9%) -0.2 (-3.7%) -3.4 (-16.3%) -2.4 (-10.9%) -17.1 (-22.7%) -14.8 (-24.9%) 
Ban on below-cost selling 0 (-0.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (-0.1%) 0.1 (0.1%) -0.1 (-0.1%) 
Promotion ban -0.1 (-2.3%) 0 (-0.4%) -0.5 (-2.3%) -0.3 (-1.3%) -2.2 (-2.9%) -1.8 (-3%) 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -0.1 (-2.3%) 0 (-0.4%) -0.5 (-2.3%) -0.3 (-1.3%) -2.2 (-2.9%) -1.8 (-3%) 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -0.1 (-3.8%) 0 (-0.3%) -0.5 (-2.3%) -0.3 (-1.3%) -2.2 (-2.9%) -1.9 (-3.2%) 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -0.1 (-3%) 0 (-0.2%) -0.5 (-2.4%) -0.4 (-1.9%) -2.1 (-2.7%) -2.6 (-4.3%) 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -0.2 (-3.8%) 0 (0.2%) -0.6 (-3.1%) -0.5 (-2.3%) -2.8 (-3.7%) -2.9 (-4.8%) 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -0.3 (-7.2%) 0 (-0.5%) -1.2 (-5.7%) -0.9 (-4.2%) -5.5 (-7.2%) -5.4 (-9%) 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -0.4 (-9.6%) -0.1 (-1.2%) -1.7 (-8.2%) -1.2 (-5.6%) -8 (-10.6%) -7.4 (-12.4%) 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -0.5 (-12.6%) -0.1 (-1.8%) -2.3 (-10.9%) -1.6 (-7.1%) -10.8 (-14.3%) -9.7 (-16.3%) 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -0.6 (-12.1%) -0.1 (-6.3%) -2.8 (-19%) -1.9 (-15.7%) -13.8 (-33.3%) -12.1 (-20.6%) 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -0.8 (-18.9%) -0.2 (-3.7%) -3.4 (-16.3%) -2.4 (-10.9%) -17.1 (-22.7%) -14.8 (-24.9%) 
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Figure 5.1: Summary of relative consumption changes by policy by drinker type 
 
Figure 5.2: Summary of absolute consumption changes by policy by drinker type 
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Figure 5.3: Summary of relative consumption changes for MUP policies by drinker type 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Income-specific effects of different levels of MUP policy on consumption 
 
 
5.1.2 Impact on consumer spending 
 
Table 5.3  and Table 5.4 shows the relative and absolute changes in consumer spending estimated to 
result from each of the modelled policies. Figures are presented for the population as a whole and 
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for key model subgroups. Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 illustrate these results graphically by 
drinker and income group. 
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Table 5.3: Summary of estimated effects of pricing policies on consumer spending – absolute and % change in consumption per drinker per 
year 
Change in spending per drinker per year (€ (%)) 
  Population Male Female Low risk Increasing risk High risk In Poverty Not in Poverty 
Drinker population 2,766,183 1,401,541 1,364,642 1,999,240 582,424 184,520 471,295 2,294,888 
Baseline spending €1,175 €1,519 €823 €508 €2,218 €5,120 €1,095 €1,192 
  
General price + 10% 52.8 (4.5%) 40.6 (2.7%) 65.2 (7.9%) 28.7 (5.7%) 90.7 (4.1%) 193.4 (3.8%) 50.2 (4.6%) 53.3 (4.9%) 
40c MUP 0.1 (0%) 0.1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (0%) -0.5 (0%) -0.1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (0%) 
50c MUP 0.3 (0%) 0.2 (0%) 0.4 (0%) 0.6 (0.1%) -0.8 (0%) 0.4 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.4 (0%) 
60c MUP 2.2 (0.2%) 1.9 (0.1%) 2.4 (0.3%) 2.6 (0.5%) -0.5 (0%) 5.7 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%) 2.4 (0.2%) 
70c MUP 6.2 (0.5%) 5.6 (0.4%) 6.8 (0.8%) 6.7 (1.3%) 2.5 (0.1%) 12.7 (0.2%) -0.6 (-0.1%) 7.6 (0.7%) 
80c MUP 11 (0.9%) 6.9 (0.5%) 15.2 (1.9%) 12.4 (2.4%) 9.3 (0.4%) 0.8 (0%) -5.7 (-0.5%) 14.4 (1.3%) 
90c MUP 14.9 (1.3%) 5 (0.3%) 25 (3%) 18.5 (3.6%) 18.6 (0.8%) -35.8 (-0.7%) -15.7 (-1.4%) 21.2 (1.9%) 
100c MUP 15.7 (1.3%) -2.5 (-0.2%) 34.5 (4.2%) 24.2 (4.8%) 25.4 (1.1%) -106.6 (-2.1%) -30.7 (-2.8%) 25.2 (2.3%) 
110c MUP 12.8 (1.1%) -16.3 (-1.1%) 42.7 (5.2%) 29 (5.7%) 26.9 (1.2%) -207.3 (-4%) -50.7 (-4.6%) 25.9 (2.4%) 
120c MUP 6.4 (0.5%) -35 (-2.3%) 49 (5.9%) 32.7 (6.4%) 22.8 (1%) -330.3 (-6.5%) -74.2 (-6.8%) 23 (2.1%) 
Ban on below-cost selling 0.5 (0%) 0.3 (0%) 0.6 (0.1%) 0.6 (0.1%) -0.8 (0%) 3.1 (0.1%) 0.4 (0%) 0.5 (0%) 
Promotion ban 7.2 (0.6%) 5.4 (0.4%) 9 (1.1%) 5.1 (1%) 13 (0.6%) 11.4 (0.2%) -4.5 (-0.4%) 9.6 (0.9%) 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP 7.4 (0.6%) 5.6 (0.4%) 9.3 (1.1%) 5.4 (1.1%) 13.2 (0.6%) 11.5 (0.2%) -4.4 (-0.4%) 9.9 (0.9%) 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP 7.9 (0.7%) 6.2 (0.4%) 9.7 (1.2%) 5.9 (1.2%) 12.8 (0.6%) 14.4 (0.3%) -4.2 (-0.4%) 10.4 (0.9%) 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP 9.7 (0.8%) 7.2 (0.5%) 12.2 (1.5%) 8.2 (1.6%) 11.5 (0.5%) 19.8 (0.4%) -2.1 (-0.2%) 12.1 (1.1%) 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP 15 (1.3%) 13.5 (0.9%) 16.5 (2%) 12.6 (2.5%) 15 (0.7%) 40.8 (0.8%) -3.3 (-0.3%) 18.7 (1.7%) 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP 11.5 (1%) 3.7 (0.2%) 19.5 (2.4%) 14.7 (2.9%) 8.2 (0.4%) -12.9 (-0.3%) -12.7 (-1.2%) 16.5 (1.5%) 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP 13.3 (1.1%) -0.1 (0%) 27 (3.3%) 19 (3.7%) 16.1 (0.7%) -57.7 (-1.1%) -20.9 (-1.9%) 20.3 (1.9%) 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP 13.2 (1.1%) -7.4 (-0.5%) 34.3 (4.2%) 23.7 (4.7%) 21.2 (1%) -126.4 (-2.5%) -34 (-3.1%) 22.9 (2.1%) 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP 12.8 (1.1%) -16.3 (-1.1%) 42.7 (5.2%) 29 (5.7%) 26.9 (1.2%) -207.3 (-4%) -50.7 (-4.6%) 25.9 (2.4%) 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP 6.4 (0.5%) -35 (-2.3%) 49 (5.9%) 32.7 (6.4%) 22.8 (1%) -330.3 (-6.5%) -74.2 (-6.8%) 23 (2.1%) 
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Table 5.4: Summary of estimated effects on consumer spending by income and drinker group 
Change in spending per drinker per year (€ (%)) 
  Low risk Increasing risk High risk 
  In poverty Not in 
poverty 
In poverty Not in 
poverty 
In poverty Not in poverty 
Drinker population 345,044 1,654,196 90,629 491,795 35,623 148,897 
Baseline spending €429 €524 €2,075 €2,244 €5,055 €5,136 
  
General price + 10% 21.4 (5%) 30.3 (5.8%) 114.7 (5.5%) 86.3 (3.8%) 165 (3.3%) 200.2 (3.9%) 
40c 0 (0%) 0.3 (0.1%) 0 (0%) -0.6 (0%) -0.2 (0%) -0.1 (0%) 
50c 0 (0%) 0.8 (0.1%) 0.5 (0%) -1.1 (0%) -0.6 (0%) 0.7 (0%) 
60c -0.8 (-0.2%) 3.3 (0.6%) 2.9 (0.1%) -1.1 (0%) 13.7 (0.3%) 3.8 (0.1%) 
70c -2 (-0.5%) 8.5 (1.6%) -3 (-0.1%) 3.5 (0.2%) 19.4 (0.4%) 11 (0.2%) 
80c -3.2 (-0.7%) 15.7 (3%) -17.2 (-0.8%) 14.2 (0.6%) -0.2 (0%) 1.1 (0%) 
90c -4.5 (-1%) 23.3 (4.4%) -40.7 (-2%) 29.5 (1.3%) -60.1 (-1.2%) -29.9 (-0.6%) 
100c -6.8 (-1.6%) 30.7 (5.8%) -71.5 (-3.4%) 43.2 (1.9%) -158.5 (-3.1%) -94.1 (-1.8%) 
110c -10.5 (-2.4%) 37.3 (7.1%) -106.9 (-5.1%) 51.6 (2.3%) -297.4 (-5.9%) -185.7 (-3.6%) 
120c -15.1 (-3.5%) 42.7 (8.2%) -144.9 (-7%) 53.7 (2.4%) -467.6 (-9.3%) -297.4 (-5.8%) 
Ban on below-cost selling -0.2 (0%) 0.8 (0.1%) 1 (0%) -1.1 (0%) 4.3 (0.1%) 2.8 (0.1%) 
Promotion ban 0.2 (0%) 6.2 (1.2%) -16.5 (-0.8%) 18.4 (0.8%) -19.4 (-0.4%) 18.8 (0.4%) 
Promotion ban + 40c 0.2 (0%) 6.4 (1.2%) -16.5 (-0.8%) 18.7 (0.8%) -17.8 (-0.4%) 18.5 (0.4%) 
Promotion ban + 50c 0.3 (0.1%) 7 (1.3%) -15.4 (-0.7%) 18 (0.8%) -19.1 (-0.4%) 22.3 (0.4%) 
Promotion ban + 60c -1.6 (-0.4%) 10.2 (2%) -11.3 (-0.5%) 15.6 (0.7%) 16.5 (0.3%) 20.6 (0.4%) 
Promotion ban + 70c -2.2 (-0.5%) 15.7 (3%) -17.2 (-0.8%) 21 (0.9%) 21.3 (0.4%) 45.4 (0.9%) 
Promotion ban + 80c -5.1 (-1.2%) 18.9 (3.6%) -38.1 (-1.8%) 16.7 (0.7%) -21.9 (-0.4%) -10.8 (-0.2%) 
Promotion ban + 90c -6 (-1.4%) 24.2 (4.6%) -52.8 (-2.5%) 28.8 (1.3%) -83.4 (-1.6%) -51.5 (-1%) 
Promotion ban + 100c -7.9 (-1.8%) 30.3 (5.8%) -77.9 (-3.8%) 39.5 (1.8%) -175.9 (-3.5%) -114.6 (-2.2%) 
Promotion ban + 110c -10.5 (-2.4%) 37.3 (7.1%) -106.9 (-5.1%) 51.6 (2.3%) -297.4 (-5.9%) -185.7 (-3.6%) 
Promotion ban + 120c -15.1 (-3.5%) 42.7 (8.2%) -144.9 (-7%) 53.7 (2.4%) -467.6 (-9.3%) -297.4 (-5.8%) 
58 
 
Figure 5.5: Summary of relative spending changes by policy by drinker type 
 
Figure 5.6: Summary of absolute spending changes by policy by drinker type 
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Figure 5.7: Income-specific effects of different levels of MUP on spending 
 
 
5.1.3 Impact on retailers and the Exchequer 
 
Table 5.5 shows the estimated impact of each policy on duty and VAT revenues to the exchequer as 
well as the total revenue to retailers, separated between the on- and off-trades11. 
                                                          
11
 Please also see note in Section 6.4 relating to VAT reclaims 
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Table 5.5: Summary of estimated effects of pricing policies on retailer and duty/VAT revenue- absolute and % change 
  
Estimated annual change in duty + VAT 
revenue to government (€million (%))  
Estimated annual change in revenue to 
retailers (after accounting for duty + 
VAT) (€million (%))  
Off-trade On-trade Total Off-trade On-trade Total 
Baseline receipts (€ million) 400.7 1202.6 1603.3 377.5 1270.4 1647.9 
  
General price + 10% -5.6 (-1.4%) 10.5 (0.9%) 4.9 (0.3%) 39.3 (10.4%) 101.8 (8%) 141 (8.6%) 
40c MUP 0 (0%) -0.1 (0%) -0.1 (0%) 0.4 (0.1%) -0.1 (0%) 0.3 (0%) 
50c MUP -0.3 (-0.1%) -0.5 (0%) -0.8 (0%) 2.4 (0.6%) -0.7 (-0.1%) 1.6 (0.1%) 
60c MUP -2 (-0.5%) -0.5 (0%) -2.5 (-0.2%) 8.9 (2.4%) -0.4 (0%) 8.5 (0.5%) 
70c MUP -6.5 (-1.6%) 1.1 (0.1%) -5.4 (-0.3%) 20 (5.3%) 2.6 (0.2%) 22.6 (1.4%) 
80c MUP -15.5 (-3.9%) 3.4 (0.3%) -12.1 (-0.8%) 35.6 (9.4%) 6.9 (0.5%) 42.5 (2.6%) 
90c MUP -26.1 (-6.5%) 4.8 (0.4%) -21.4 (-1.3%) 53.3 (14.1%) 9.3 (0.7%) 62.6 (3.8%) 
100c MUP -39.1 (-9.8%) 4.8 (0.4%) -34.3 (-2.1%) 68.5 (18.1%) 9.3 (0.7%) 77.8 (4.7%) 
110c MUP -55.5 (-13.8%) 4.7 (0.4%) -50.8 (-3.2%) 77.3 (20.5%) 8.9 (0.7%) 86.2 (5.2%) 
120c MUP -73.9 (-18.4%) 4.3 (0.4%) -69.6 (-4.3%) 79.2 (21%) 8.1 (0.6%) 87.4 (5.3%) 
Ban on below-cost selling 0.7 (0.2%) -0.8 (-0.1%) -0.1 (0%) 2.7 (0.7%) -1.3 (-0.1%) 1.4 (0.1%) 
Promotion ban -3.3 (-0.8%) -1.3 (-0.1%) -4.6 (-0.3%) 27.4 (7.3%) -2.8 (-0.2%) 24.6 (1.5%) 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -3.2 (-0.8%) -1.3 (-0.1%) -4.5 (-0.3%) 27.5 (7.3%) -2.5 (-0.2%) 25.1 (1.5%) 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -2.7 (-0.7%) -1.7 (-0.1%) -4.4 (-0.3%) 29.4 (7.8%) -3.2 (-0.3%) 26.2 (1.6%) 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -2.7 (-0.7%) -3.6 (-0.3%) -6.3 (-0.4%) 39.4 (10.4%) -6.4 (-0.5%) 33 (2%) 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -3.4 (-0.9%) -0.9 (-0.1%) -4.3 (-0.3%) 47 (12.4%) -1.2 (-0.1%) 45.8 (2.8%) 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -14.4 (-3.6%) -4.4 (-0.4%) -18.8 (-1.2%) 58.6 (15.5%) -7.9 (-0.6%) 50.6 (3.1%) 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -27.1 (-6.8%) -0.6 (0%) -27.7 (-1.7%) 65.2 (17.3%) -0.8 (-0.1%) 64.4 (3.9%) 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -40.6 (-10.1%) 1.6 (0.1%) -39 (-2.4%) 72.2 (19.1%) 3.3 (0.3%) 75.4 (4.6%) 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -55.5 (-13.8%) 4.7 (0.4%) -50.8 (-3.2%) 77.3 (20.5%) 8.9 (0.7%) 86.2 (5.2%) 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -73.9 (-18.4%) 4.3 (0.4%) -69.6 (-4.3%) 79.2 (21%) 8.1 (0.6%) 87.4 (5.3%) 
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5.1.4 Impact on health outcomes 
 
Table 5.6 presents the impact of each modelled policy on deaths and hospital admissions per year at 
full effect (i.e. in the 20th year following policy implementation) as well as the estimated annual QALY 
gains. These are shown as relative changes in Figure 5.8. Table 5.7 illustrates the equity implications 
of the health impact of each policy by showing the reductions in deaths and hospitalisations at full 
effect for each income group. These figures are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. 
Table 5.8 shows the impact of each policy at full effect on liver disease outcomes. Table 5.9 and 
Table 5.10 present the ‘partial effects’ of each policy on deaths and hospital admissions – i.e. the 
changing impact across the 20 years following policy implementation – broken down by condition 
type. Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show these trends over time in total deaths and hospital 
admissions.  
The principal finding is that both MUP and promotion ban policies are effective at improving alcohol-
related health outcomes, with a 90c MUP estimated to lead to a 10.9% reduction in alcohol-related 
deaths and 7.0% fewer alcohol-related hospital admissions per year (in the 20th year following policy 
implementation when the full effect of the health benefits of the policy are felt). The majority of 
these gains (66.2% of deaths and 64.8% of admissions for a 90c MUP) are in improved chronic 
disease outcomes, particularly alcoholic liver disease (29.5% of all deaths and 11.0% of all admissions 
for a 90c MUP). Higher MUP thresholds lead to greater health benefits (e.g. a 15.5% reduction in 
deaths and 10.0% reduction in hospital admissions for 100c MUP), as does the addition of a ban on 
off-trade promotions to an MUP policy (e.g. a 12.9% and 8.36% reduction in deaths and hospital 
admissions respectively for a 90c MUP policy combined with a promotions ban).      
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Table 5.6: Summary of policy impacts on health outcomes – changes in alcohol-related 
deaths, hospital admissions and QALYs per year at full effect (20 years) 
Policy 
Estimated change in 
deaths in 20th year 
following policy 
implementation 
Estimated change in 
hospital admissions in 20th 
year following policy 
implementation 
Estimated 
QALYs gained in 
20th year 
following policy 
implementation Total Acute Chronic Total Acute Chronic 
Baseline level 1,270 740 530 58,961 24,499 34,462 
   
General price + 10% -147 -58 -89 -4,666 -1,870 -2,797 1,184 
40c MUP -1 0 -1 -46 -6 -40 8 
50c MUP -6 -1 -4 -206 -46 -160 45 
60c MUP -23 -7 -16 -674 -196 -478 173 
70c MUP -46 -14 -32 -1,338 -427 -912 365 
80c MUP -88 -29 -59 -2,549 -879 -1,670 708 
90c MUP -139 -47 -92 -4,102 -1,443 -2,659 1,130 
100c MUP -197 -68 -129 -5,878 -2,086 -3,792 1,603 
110c MUP -257 -89 -168 -7,737 -2,770 -4,967 2,098 
120c MUP -312 -111 -202 -9,483 -3,434 -6,048 2,561 
Ban on below-cost 
selling 
-4 -1 -3 -166 -27 -139 31 
Promotion ban -45 -15 -30 -1,382 -486 -896 361 
Promotion ban + 40c 
MUP 
-46 -16 -30 -1,403 -488 -915 365 
Promotion ban + 50c 
MUP 
-46 -15 -31 -1,445 -482 -963 370 
Promotion ban + 60c 
MUP 
-65 -21 -44 -1,992 -640 -1,352 510 
Promotion ban + 70c 
MUP 
-73 -22 -51 -2,164 -676 -1,488 571 
Promotion ban + 80c 
MUP 
-121 -40 -81 -3,595 -1,237 -2,358 969 
Promotion ban + 90c 
MUP 
-164 -56 -108 -4,896 -1,722 -3,174 1,326 
Promotion ban + 100c 
MUP 
-210 -72 -137 -6,294 -2,241 -4,053 1,708 
Promotion ban + 110c 
MUP 
-257 -89 -168 -7,737 -2,770 -4,967 2,098 
Promotion ban + 120c 
MUP 
-312 -111 -202 -9,483 -3,434 -6,048 2,561 
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Table 5.7: Income specific health outcomes – policy impacts on deaths and hospital 
admissions per year per 100,000 population at full effect (20 years) 
Policy 
In poverty Not in poverty 
Deaths per 
100,000 
population 
Hospital 
admissions per 
100,000 
population 
Deaths per 
100,000 
population 
Hospital 
admissions per 
100,000 
population 
Baseline 46.5 1961.9 33.3 1589.9 
  
General price + 10% -3.4 -110.6 -4.3 -136.2 
40c MUP 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.6 
50c MUP 0.0 -1.8 -0.2 -6.7 
60c MUP -0.3 -12.2 -0.7 -20.6 
70c MUP -1.2 -40.8 -1.3 -37.0 
80c MUP -2.6 -89.5 -2.4 -67.7 
90c MUP -4.4 -153.9 -3.8 -106.6 
100c MUP -6.2 -227.1 -5.4 -151.2 
110c MUP -8.1 -298.2 -7.0 -199.1 
120c MUP -9.9 -364.7 -8.5 -244.3 
Ban on below-cost selling 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -5.6 
Promotion ban -1.2 -44.3 -1.3 -37.7 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -1.2 -43.9 -1.3 -38.5 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -1.2 -43.7 -1.3 -40.0 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -1.4 -51.3 -1.9 -57.2 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -1.8 -64.6 -2.1 -60.1 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -3.4 -118.5 -3.4 -97.2 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -4.8 -175.3 -4.6 -129.1 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -6.5 -237.5 -5.8 -163.2 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -8.1 -298.2 -7.0 -199.1 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -9.9 -364.7 -8.5 -244.3 
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Figure 5.8: Summary of relative changes in deaths and hospital admissions per year at full 
effect 
 
Figure 5.9: Income-specific reductions in deaths per year per 100,000 population 
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Figure 5.10: Income-specific reductions in hospital admissions per year per 100,000 
population 
 
 
 
-400
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
R
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 in
 h
o
sp
it
al
 a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 p
e
r 
ye
ar
 
In poverty
Not in poverty
66 
 
Table 5.8: Summary of policy impacts on alcoholic liver disease outcomes at full effect (20 
years) 
Policy 
Alcoholic liver disease (ICD-10 code K70) 
Deaths Hospital admissions 
Baseline 340 3,602 
  
General price + 10% -37 -390 
40c MUP 0 -4 
50c MUP -2 -20 
60c MUP -7 -78 
70c MUP -15 -160 
80c MUP -27 -293 
90c MUP -41 -450 
100c MUP -57 -621 
110c MUP -73 -801 
120c MUP -89 -968 
Ban on below-cost selling -1 -13 
Promotion ban -13 -141 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -13 -143 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -14 -146 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -19 -209 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -22 -241 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -36 -387 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -48 -518 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -60 -657 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -73 -801 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -89 -968 
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Table 5.9: Summary of impact of policies on annual deaths by condition type 
Policy 
Reduction in deaths per year - partial effects 
Acute Chronic Total 
Year 
1 
Year 
5 
Year 
10 
Year 
15 
Year 
20 
Year 
1 
Year 
5 
Year 
10 
Year 
15 
Year 
20 
Year 
1 
Year 
5 
Year 
10 
Year 
15 
Year 
20 
Baseline 626 671 708 728 740 -6
* 
-30
* 
41 307 530 619 641 750 1,035 1,270 
 
General price +10% -51 -54 -56 -57 -58 -12 -38 -52 -72 -89 -63 -92 -108 -130 -147 
40c MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
50c MUP -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -2 -2 -3 -4 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
60c MUP -5 -6 -6 -6 -7 -2 -6 -9 -13 -16 -7 -12 -16 -19 -23 
70c MUP -12 -13 -14 -14 -14 -3 -12 -18 -26 -32 -15 -26 -32 -40 -46 
80c MUP -26 -28 -29 -29 -29 -6 -23 -34 -48 -59 -32 -51 -63 -77 -88 
90c MUP -42 -45 -47 -47 -47 -10 -38 -54 -75 -92 -52 -83 -101 -122 -139 
100c MUP -61 -65 -68 -68 -68 -14 -53 -76 -105 -129 -75 -118 -143 -173 -197 
110c MUP -81 -86 -90 -90 -89 -19 -69 -98 -136 -168 -100 -155 -187 -226 -257 
120c MUP -101 -107 -111 -111 -111 -23 -83 -117 -164 -202 -124 -190 -228 -275 -312 
Ban on below-cost selling 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -2 -3 -3 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 
Promotion ban -13 -14 -15 -15 -15 -4 -12 -18 -24 -30 -17 -27 -33 -40 -45 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -13 -15 -15 -16 -16 -4 -13 -18 -25 -30 -17 -27 -33 -40 -46 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -13 -14 -15 -15 -15 -4 -13 -18 -25 -31 -17 -27 -33 -41 -46 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -17 -19 -20 -21 -21 -5 -18 -26 -36 -44 -22 -37 -46 -57 -65 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -19 -21 -22 -22 -22 -6 -21 -30 -41 -51 -24 -41 -52 -64 -73 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -36 -38 -40 -40 -40 -9 -33 -47 -65 -81 -44 -71 -87 -105 -121 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -50 -53 -56 -56 -56 -12 -44 -63 -88 -108 -62 -98 -119 -144 -164 
Promotion ban + 100c 
MUP 
-65 -69 -72 -73 -72 -15 -57 -80 -112 -137 -81 -126 -153 -184 -210 
Promotion ban + 110c 
MUP 
-81 -86 -90 -90 -89 -19 -69 -98 -136 -168 -100 -155 -187 -226 -257 
Promotion ban + 120c 
MUP 
-101 -107 -111 -111 -111 -23 -83 -117 -164 -202 -124 -190 -228 -275 -312 
* This value is negative because it is estimated that, due to the ‘protective’ effect of moderate alcohol consumption on ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke and type II diabetes, alcohol has an overall 
protective effect for low risk drinkers, although there is some debate in the scientific community that this effect exists at all (see, for example [38])  
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Table 5.10: Summary of impact of policies on annual hospital admissions by condition type 
Policy 
Reduction in hospital admissions per year - partial effects 
Acute Chronic Total 
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 
Baseline 20,574 22,117 23,379 24,049 24,499 3,276 12,919 19,189 27,490 34,462 23,850 35,036 42,567 51,539 58,961 
  
General price +10% -1,613 -1,727 -1,810 -1,849 -1,870 -386 -1,422 -1,922 -2,404 -2,797 -1,999 -3,150 -3,732 -4,252 -4,666 
40c MUP -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -5 -22 -31 -37 -40 -10 -27 -37 -42 -46 
50c MUP -35 -40 -44 -46 -46 -19 -81 -116 -140 -160 -54 -121 -160 -186 -206 
60c MUP -152 -173 -187 -193 -196 -52 -222 -324 -409 -478 -203 -394 -511 -602 -674 
70c MUP -358 -395 -420 -426 -427 -96 -414 -607 -774 -912 -454 -809 -1,027 -1,200 -1,338 
80c MUP -770 -833 -876 -882 -879 -186 -770 -1,113 -1,418 -1,670 -956 -1,603 -1,989 -2,300 -2,549 
90c MUP -1,278 -1,374 -1,439 -1,448 -1,443 -303 -1,244 -1,785 -2,264 -2,659 -1,582 -2,618 -3,224 -3,711 -4,102 
100c MUP -1,858 -1,989 -2,080 -2,092 -2,086 -438 -1,789 -2,556 -3,233 -3,792 -2,295 -3,778 -4,636 -5,325 -5,878 
110c MUP -2,476 -2,645 -2,763 -2,778 -2,770 -578 -2,349 -3,347 -4,234 -4,967 -3,054 -4,994 -6,110 -7,012 -7,737 
120c MUP -3,090 -3,290 -3,431 -3,446 -3,434 -707 -2,861 -4,069 -5,152 -6,048 -3,797 -6,151 -7,500 -8,598 -9,483 
Ban on below-cost selling -17 -22 -25 -27 -27 -17 -73 -105 -124 -139 -34 -95 -130 -150 -166 
Promotion ban -414 -450 -475 -483 -486 -111 -438 -614 -771 -896 -526 -888 -1,090 -1,254 -1,382 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -416 -452 -477 -485 -488 -114 -449 -629 -788 -915 -530 -901 -1,107 -1,273 -1,403 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -410 -446 -472 -480 -482 -120 -477 -670 -833 -963 -530 -924 -1,142 -1,313 -1,445 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -523 -581 -621 -635 -640 -157 -648 -927 -1,162 -1,352 -680 -1,229 -1,548 -1,797 -1,992 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -562 -624 -666 -675 -676 -169 -703 -1,012 -1,274 -1,488 -731 -1,327 -1,678 -1,950 -2,164 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -1,081 -1,170 -1,230 -1,240 -1,237 -270 -1,105 -1,582 -2,007 -2,358 -1,350 -2,274 -2,813 -3,247 -3,595 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -1,517 -1,632 -1,711 -1,724 -1,722 -367 -1,497 -2,138 -2,706 -3,174 -1,883 -3,129 -3,850 -4,431 -4,896 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -1,993 -2,134 -2,232 -2,246 -2,241 -470 -1,914 -2,731 -3,455 -4,053 -2,462 -4,048 -4,963 -5,701 -6,294 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -2,476 -2,645 -2,763 -2,778 -2,770 -578 -2,349 -3,347 -4,234 -4,967 -3,054 -4,994 -6,110 -7,012 -7,737 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -3,090 -3,290 -3,431 -3,446 -3,434 -707 -2,861 -4,069 -5,152 -6,048 -3,797 -6,151 -7,500 -8,598 -9,483 
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Figure 5.11: Estimated reductions in deaths over time for exemplar MUP policies 
 
Figure 5.12: Estimated reductions in hospital admissions over time for exemplar MUP 
policies 
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5.1.5 Impact on crime outcomes 
 
The estimated impact of the modelled policies on annual volumes of crime is shown in Table 5.11, 
including the differential impact by drinker group. Table 5.12 shows the changes in annual crime 
volumes, broken down further by category of crime. Relative reductions in crime by drinker group 
are presented in Figure 5.13.  
The principal finding is that MUP policies, a ban on off-trade promotions and combinations of the 
two are effective measures to reduce alcohol-related crime. A 90c MUP policy is estimated to lead to 
1,043 fewer alcohol-related crimes per year, a reduction of 5.3%. The majority of these gains (70.5% 
for a 90c MUP) are from reduced levels of criminal damage. Higher MUP thresholds lead to greater 
reductions (e.g. 1,493 fewer crimes for a 100c MUP) as does the addition of a promotions ban to an 
MUP policy (e.g. 1,182 fewer crimes for a 90c MUP in combination with a promotions ban.   
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Table 5.11: Impact of modelled policies on annual crime volumes 
Policy 
Changes in annual crime volumes 
Population Low risk 
Increasing 
risk 
High 
risk 
Baseline volume 19,844 8,592 6,977 4,275 
  
General price + 10% -1,002 -486 -330 -186 
40c MUP -2 -1 0 0 
50c MUP -26 -9 -6 -11 
60c MUP -121 -39 -41 -41 
70c MUP -317 -86 -124 -107 
80c MUP -654 -183 -256 -215 
90c MUP -1,043 -306 -396 -341 
100c MUP -1,493 -461 -547 -485 
110c MUP -1,973 -638 -698 -637 
120c MUP -2,453 -819 -845 -788 
Ban on below-cost selling -3 -2 -1 0 
Promotion ban -271 -85 -92 -95 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -269 -86 -91 -92 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -262 -76 -85 -101 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -325 -94 -110 -122 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -385 -89 -158 -138 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -849 -252 -329 -269 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -1,182 -364 -438 -380 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -1,582 -501 -573 -508 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -1,973 -638 -698 -637 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -2,453 -819 -845 -788 
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Table 5.12: Estimated changes in annual crime volumes by crime category 
Policy 
Changes in annual crime volumes 
Violent 
crimes 
Criminal 
damage 
Robbery, 
burglary & theft 
Baseline volume 4,101 13,460 2,283 
  
General price + 10% -210 -689 -103 
40c MUP 0 -1 0 
50c MUP -5 -18 -2 
60c MUP -23 -87 -11 
70c MUP -60 -226 -31 
80c MUP -125 -463 -67 
90c MUP -200 -735 -108 
100c MUP -288 -1,048 -157 
110c MUP -381 -1,382 -209 
120c MUP -475 -1,717 -261 
Ban on below-cost selling -1 -2 0 
Promotion ban -55 -189 -27 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -54 -188 -27 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -53 -183 -26 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -64 -230 -31 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -75 -273 -37 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -165 -596 -88 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -229 -830 -123 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -306 -1,110 -167 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -381 -1,382 -209 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -475 -1,717 -261 
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Figure 5.13: Summary of relative changes in alcohol-attributable crime volumes by drinker 
group 
 
 
5.1.6 Impact on workplace outcomes 
Table 5.13 presents the modelled impact of each policy on the number of days per year lost to 
workplace absenteeism. Figure 5.14 illustrates this in terms of relative changes in absence days by 
drinker group. 
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Table 5.13: Estimated changes in workplace absence 
Policy 
Changes in days absence from work (1,000s) 
Population Low risk 
Increasing 
risk High risk 
Baseline absence 1106.6 434.3 413.8 258.5 
  
General price + 10% -82.7 -37.9 -28.2 -16.6 
40c MUP -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
50c MUP -2.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 
60c MUP -7.6 -1.4 -2.9 -3.3 
70c MUP -20.0 -3.9 -7.6 -8.5 
80c MUP -45.3 -10.9 -16.9 -17.5 
90c MUP -77.8 -21.0 -28.8 -28.1 
100c MUP -115.6 -33.2 -42.3 -40.1 
110c MUP -155.9 -46.9 -56.2 -52.9 
120c MUP -197.1 -61.0 -70.3 -65.8 
Ban on below-cost selling -0.9 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 
Promotion ban -21.4 -6.4 -7.8 -7.1 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -21.4 -6.4 -7.9 -7.1 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -21.5 -5.9 -7.7 -7.9 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -25.6 -5.8 -10.0 -9.9 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -28.9 -5.0 -12.1 -11.8 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -63.9 -16.8 -24.0 -23.1 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -91.1 -25.8 -33.7 -31.7 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -123.6 -36.4 -45.0 -42.2 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -155.9 -46.9 -56.2 -52.9 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -197.1 -61.0 -70.3 -65.8 
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Figure 5.14: Summary of relative changes in workplace absence by drinker  
 
 
5.1.7 Impact on societal costs 
 
Table 5.14 gives an overview of the estimated annual savings resulting from the implementation of 
each of the modelled policies. These savings are presented separately for healthcare costs, costs 
associated with crime and the cost of workplace absenteeism. It should be noted that these costs 
may not be fully realised in practice as, for example, crime costs incorporate a financial valuation of 
the impact on the victim. 
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Table 5.14: Summary of financial valuation of impact of modelled policies on health, crime and workplace related harm in year 1 and 
cumulatively over 20 years 
Policy 
Value of harm reductions in year 1 (€m) 
 
Cumulative value of harm reductions over 20 years 
(€m) 
Healthcare 
costs 
QALY 
valuation 
Crime 
costs 
Work 
absence 
costs 
Total 
costs  
Healthcare 
costs 
QALY 
valuation 
Crime 
costs 
Work 
absence 
costs 
Total 
costs 
Baseline cost (€millions) 78.6 
 
98.1 149.4 326.1 
 
2,301.7 
 
1,442.9 2,198.4 5,943.0 
 
General price + 10% -5.7 -21.8 -5.2 -12.3 -45.0 
 
-186.9 -852.4 -76.3 -180.3 -1,295.9 
40c MUP 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
 
-2.4 -5.7 -0.1 -1.2 -9.3 
50c MUP -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -1.2 
 
-9.5 -30.0 -1.9 -5.0 -46.4 
60c MUP -0.7 -2.2 -0.6 -1.2 -4.7 
 
-29.1 -113.2 -8.6 -17.4 -168.4 
70c MUP -1.5 -5.1 -1.5 -2.9 -11.0 
 
-58.3 -242.7 -21.5 -42.4 -364.9 
80c MUP -3.1 -10.9 -3.0 -6.4 -23.4 
 
-110.9 -480.4 -44.8 -93.6 -729.7 
90c MUP -5.2 -17.9 -4.9 -10.9 -38.8 
 
-178.1 -774.7 -71.6 -160.3 -1,184.7 
100c MUP -7.4 -25.9 -7.0 -16.1 -56.5 
 
-254.7 -1,106.5 -102.7 -236.6 -1,700.5 
110c MUP -9.9 -34.5 -9.2 -21.7 -75.3 
 
-334.6 -1,454.3 -136.0 -318.7 -2,243.6 
120c MUP -12.3 -42.9 -11.5 -27.4 -94.1 
 
-409.6 -1,784.4 -169.0 -402.7 -2,765.8 
Ban on below-cost selling -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 
 
-7.9 -20.8 -0.4 -2.3 -31.4 
Promotion ban -1.6 -5.8 -1.4 -3.2 -11.9 
 
-58.7 -249.8 -20.0 -46.8 -375.3 
Promotion ban + 40c MUP -1.6 -5.8 -1.3 -3.2 -12.0 
 
-59.8 -252.4 -19.8 -47.1 -379.1 
Promotion ban + 50c MUP -1.7 -5.8 -1.3 -3.2 -12.0 
 
-62.5 -255.1 -19.2 -47.7 -384.6 
Promotion ban + 60c MUP -2.2 -7.4 -1.6 -4.1 -15.3 
 
-85.7 -345.1 -23.5 -59.6 -513.9 
Promotion ban + 70c MUP -2.4 -8.1 -1.8 -4.4 -16.7 
 
-94.6 -383.0 -27.1 -64.1 -568.7 
Promotion ban + 80c MUP -4.4 -15.2 -4.0 -8.9 -32.5  
-156.1 -663.7 -59.4 -130.3 -1,009.4 
Promotion ban + 90c MUP -6.1 -21.2 -5.6 -12.9 -45.7  
-211.6 -912.8 -81.9 -189.1 -1,395.5 
Promotion ban + 100c MUP -8.0 -37.1 -7.4 -17.2 -69.7  
-272.1 -1,180.6 -109.3 -253.3 -1,815.3 
Promotion ban + 110c MUP -9.9 -34.5 -9.2 -21.7 -75.3  
-334.6 -1,454.3 -136.0 -318.7 -2,243.6 
Promotion ban + 120c MUP -12.3 -21.8 -11.5 -27.4 -94.1  
-409.6 -1,784.4 -169.0 -402.7 -2765.8 
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5.2 EXAMPLE POLICY ANALYSIS A: 90C MUP 
 
This section describes the estimated impacts of a minimum unit price policy of 90c per standard 
drink in detail. We assume that this threshold is updated annually in line with inflation. In addition to 
the results already presented in Table 5.1 to Table 5.14, further detailed results are shown in Table 
5.15 to Table 5.19 and in Figure 5.15 for consumption changes, consumer spending and health 
outcomes. 
Across the whole population, 34.3% of standard drinks purchased would be affected (i.e. would 
have their price raised to 90c). The proportion and absolute number of purchased standard drinks 
per week affected for high risk drinkers (44.5% or 27.8 std. drinks) is substantially more than for 
increasing risk drinkers (32.4% or 7.1 std. drinks) or low risk drinkers (29.6% or 1.0 std. drink). The 
proportion and number of purchased standard drinks per week affected is slightly higher for those in 
poverty than those above the poverty line (38.4% and 3.4 std. drinks vs. 33.3% and 3.2 std. drinks), 
though this difference is primarily driven by a substantial difference between high risk drinkers in 
poverty (54.8% or 41.3 std. drinks) vs. high risk drinkers not in poverty (41.6% or 24.8 std. drinks). 
Across the whole population, mean weekly consumption is estimated to change by -6.2%. 
Consumption is estimated to reduce by 0.58 std. drinks per person, or 0.74 std. drinks per drinker 
per week. Weekly consumption reductions are greater for high risk drinkers (-9.4% or 6.7 std. drinks) 
than low risk drinkers (-1.9% or 0.1 std. drinks) and for those in poverty (-8.7% or 1.1 std. drinks) 
compared to those not in poverty (-5.6% or 0.7 std. drinks). 
In both income groups, absolute reductions in consumption are estimated to be small for low risk 
drinkers and much larger for high risk drinkers. However; for people below the poverty line the 
relative change in consumption is similar across all drinkers, while for those above the poverty line 
the relative changes are considerably larger for heavier drinkers. The estimated consumption 
reduction for low risk drinkers in poverty is -8.6% or 0.35 std. drinks per week compared to -9.8% or 
7.34 std. drinks per week for high risk drinkers in poverty. The corresponding figures for those not in 
poverty are -0.6% or 0.03 std. drinks and -11.0% or 6.57 std. drinks. 
Across the whole population, estimated spending increases by 1.3% or €14.90 per drinker per year 
(€0.29 per week). The cost impact of the policy on consumer spending varies significantly between 
different drinker and income subgroups. Low risk and increasing risk drinkers are estimated to 
increase their spending by €18.50 and €18.60 per year respectively, while high risk drinkers reduce 
their spending by €35.80. Similar differences are observed between income subgroups, with those in 
poverty saving €15.70 per year compared to a spending increase of €21.20 per year for those not in 
poverty. 
Those in poverty are estimated to save money at all levels of consumption, with low risk, 
increasing risk and high risk drinkers saving €4.50, €40.70 and €60.10 per year respectively. A 
different pattern is observed for those not in poverty, with low risk and increasing risk drinkers 
increasing their spending by €23.30 and €29.50 per year respectively, whilst high risk drinkers reduce 
their spending by €29.90. These differing patterns are a result of both the different proportion of 
each population subgroup’s purchases which are affected by the policy, as well as the different price 
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elasticities of the beverages which make up a greater or lesser proportion of each subgroup’s 
purchases. 
Overall revenue to the Exchequer from duty and VAT receipts is estimated to reduce by 1.3% or 
€21.4 million12. 
Revenue to retailers is estimated to increase by €53.3million (14.1%) in the off-trade and 
€9.3million (0.7%) in the on-trade. This is as reduced sales volumes are more than offset by the 
increased value of remaining sales. 
Effects on health are estimated to be substantial, with alcohol-attributable deaths estimated to 
reduce by approximately 139 per year after 20 years, by which time the full effects of the policy will 
be seen. Annual deaths are distributed differentially across drinker groups with approximately 7 
saved amongst low risk drinkers, 40 amongst increasing risk drinkers and 92 amongst high risk 
drinkers. Whilst those in poverty see a smaller absolute number of reduced deaths (29 vs. 110 for 
those not in poverty), they also comprise a substantially smaller proportion of the population 
(18.9%), meaning that the relative reductions in annual deaths per 100,000 population is greater 
amongst those in poverty (4.4 vs. 3.8 per 100,000 for those not in poverty). 
Similar patterns are observed amongst reductions in alcohol-related hospital admissions, with an 
estimated 4,102 fewer admissions per year across the population. Admissions reductions for low 
risk, increasing risk and high risk drinkers are 330, 1,180 and 2,590 respectively. Again, those in 
poverty experience a lower absolute reduction in hospital admissions (1,030 vs. 3,070) but a larger 
reduction per 100,000 population (154 vs. 107). Direct healthcare costs are estimated to reduce by 
€5.2m in year 1 and by €178.1m cumulatively over 20 years. 
Crime is estimated to fall by 1,043 offences per year overall. Reductions are spread relatively 
evenly between drinker groups, with 306, 396 and 341 fewer offences committed by low risk, 
increasing risk and high risk drinkers respectively. However, it should be noted that increasing risk 
and high risk drinkers (16% and 5% respectively) make up a considerably smaller proportion of the 
population than low risk drinkers (78%). Costs of crime and policing are estimated to reduce by 
€4.9m in year 1 and by €71.6m cumulatively over 20 years. 
Workplace absence is estimated to be reduced by 77,800 per year. This is estimated to lead to an 
annual saving of €10.9m in year 1 and €160.3m over 20 years.   
The total societal value of these reductions in health, crime and workplace harms is estimated at 
€1.18bn over the 20 year period modelled. This includes direct healthcare costs (€178m), crime 
costs (€72m), workplace costs (€160m) and a financial valuation of the QALY gain (€775m), assuming 
a QALY is valued at €45,000. All costs and benefits are discounted at 3.5%. 
                                                          
12
 Please also see note in Section 6.4 on VAT reclaims 
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Table 5.15: Detailed consumption and spending results for 90c MUP 
  Population Male Female 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty Low risk 
Increasing 
risk High risk 
Baseline statistics       
Baseline Consumption (std. 
drinks per week) 
9.4 12.8 6.0 8.9 9.5 3.2 21.9 62.5 
Population size 
3,551,435 1,762,437 
1,788,99
8 
670,889 
2,880,54
6 
2,784,491 582,424 184,520 
Baseline Consumption 
(drinker) 
12.0 16.1 7.9 12.7 11.9 4.5 21.9 62.5 
Drinker population 
2,766,183 1,401,541 
1,364,64
2 
471,295 
2,294,88
8 
1,999,240 582,424 184,520 
% drinkers 77.9% 79.5% 76.3% 70.2% 79.7% 71.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks 
per drinker per year 
   Off-beer 108.7 173.6 42.0 160.7 98.0 29.9 172.8 760.3 
Off-cider 28.7 32.4 25.0 51.6 24.0 9.1 31.5 232.6 
Off-wine 109.3 94.9 124.0 67.5 117.9 43.8 220.2 468.3 
Off-spirits 40.4 44.3 36.5 36.9 41.1 15.5 58.5 254.1 
Off-RTDs 1.8 0.9 2.8 4.5 1.3 1.3 3.8 1.4 
On-beer 230.2 393.8 62.1 212.8 233.8 82.1 462.6 1100.8 
On-cider 32.6 40.6 24.4 43.4 30.4 11.4 43.4 228.0 
On-wine 24.3 14.9 34.0 15.2 26.2 17.4 44.2 36.5 
On-spirits 49.6 43.8 55.6 65.1 46.5 23.8 98.8 174.6 
On-RTDs 2.3 0.2 4.4 5.5 1.6 1.5 4.4 3.9 
Total 628.0 839.5 410.8 663.2 620.7 235.8 1140.2 3260.5 
Spending, euros per drinker per year 
   Off-beer 93.6 150.5 35.1 147.3 82.6 27.3 162.3 594.8 
Off-cider 21.2 25.2 17.1 26.8 20.0 8.4 22.9 153.9 
Off-wine 118.0 93.0 143.7 79.0 126.0 56.7 236.1 409.9 
Off-spirits 47.5 62.6 32.0 24.0 52.3 11.4 47.4 439.1 
Off-RTDs 1.0 0.6 1.5 1.8 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 
On-beer 515.8 860.4 161.9 461.6 527.0 194.3 1074.4 2236.0 
On-cider 72.6 86.2 58.6 81.5 70.8 25.4 100.9 494.3 
On-wine 78.1 46.8 110.3 33.7 87.2 58.3 141.3 93.2 
On-spirits 222.2 193.2 251.9 232.1 220.1 117.8 429.4 698.9 
On-RTDs 5.4 0.0 10.9 7.6 4.9 6.5 3.1 0.0 
Total 1175.3 1518.6 822.8 1095.3 1191.8 507.6 2217.7 5120.0 
  
        After intervention / Change from 
baseline 
   Changes in consumption 
(std. drinks per drinker) 
-0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.1 -1.1 -6.7 
Changes in consumption 
(%) 
-6.2% -7.6% -3.2% -8.7% -5.6% -1.9% -5.1% -10.7% 
Final Consumption (drinker) 11.3 14.9 7.6 11.6 11.2 4.4 20.8 55.8 
Absolute change in sales/Consumption 
volume, std. drinks per drinker per year 
    Off-beer -31.3 -52.8 -9.2 -41.4 -29.2 -6.3 -43.8 -262.6 
Off-cider -6.0 -8.9 -3.1 -4.9 -6.3 -1.7 -10.6 -39.4 
Off-wine 1.3 3.0 -0.4 -2.7 2.1 1.6 4.2 -10.6 
Off-spirits -3.5 -5.5 -1.5 -2.3 -3.8 -1.2 -5.6 -21.9 
Off-RTDs -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3 -1.3 -0.4 
On-beer -2.5 -3.6 -1.4 -5.2 -2.0 0.7 -5.2 -29.0 
On-cider 2.3 3.3 1.2 0.0 2.7 1.3 2.1 13.7 
On-wine 1.9 1.4 2.4 0.5 2.2 1.2 3.7 3.6 
On-spirits -0.7 -0.3 -1.1 -1.5 -0.6 0.1 -2.3 -4.2 
On-RTDs 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.6 
Total -38.7 -63.6 -13.2 -57.7 -34.8 -4.4 -58.0 -350.2 
Absolute change in spending, euros 
per drinker per year 
   Off-beer -5.9 -10.4 -1.3 -10.2 -5.0 -0.5 -6.7 -62.3 
Off-cider -1.2 -2.1 -0.3 1.3 -1.7 -0.5 -3.7 -0.8 
Off-wine 16.0 14.7 17.3 6.8 17.9 6.7 30.0 72.8 
Off-spirits 1.2 -1.7 4.1 1.8 1.0 1.7 2.8 -9.7 
Off-RTDs -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 
On-beer -4.8 -6.2 -3.4 -11.9 -3.4 2.6 -12.2 -62.2 
On-cider 5.2 7.5 2.9 -0.4 6.4 3.0 4.5 31.1 
On-wine 6.2 4.3 8.2 0.6 7.4 4.0 12.7 10.0 
On-spirits -2.4 -0.8 -3.9 -4.2 -2.0 0.8 -9.3 -14.7 
On-RTDs 0.8 0.0 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.0 
Total 14.9 5.0 25.0 -15.7 21.2 18.5 18.6 -35.8 
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Table 5.16: Detailed income and drinker group-specific results for 90c MUP 
  
In Poverty Not in Poverty 
Low risk Increasing risk High risk Low risk Increasing risk High risk 
Baseline statistics           
Baseline Consumption (std. drinks per 
week) 
2.6 21.1 75.3 3.4 22.0 59.5 
Population size 544,638 90,629 35,623 2,239,854 491,795 148,897 
Baseline Consumption (drinker) 4.1 21.1 75.3 4.6 22.0 59.5 
Drinker population 345,044 90,629 35,623 1,654,196 491,795 148,897 
% drinkers 63.4% 100.0% 100.0% 73.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks per 
drinker per year 
     Off-beer 31.6 174.4 1376.5 29.5 172.4 612.9 
Off-cider 13.9 24.4 486.1 8.1 32.8 171.9 
Off-wine 27.1 112.6 343.7 47.3 240.1 498.1 
Off-spirits 19.1 45.5 188.6 14.7 60.8 269.7 
Off-RTDs 3.8 7.6 2.7 0.8 3.1 1.1 
On-beer 73.6 433.8 998.2 83.9 467.8 1125.4 
On-cider 12.1 75.0 266.5 11.3 37.6 218.8 
On-wine 9.5 37.8 13.1 19.0 45.4 42.1 
On-spirits 18.7 172.0 242.5 24.8 85.3 158.4 
On-RTDs 2.6 15.9 7.4 1.3 2.3 3.0 
Total 211.9 1099.2 3925.3 240.7 1147.7 3101.4 
Spending, euros per drinker per year 
     Off-beer 29.3 120.4 1358.8 26.9 170.1 412.0 
Off-cider 9.3 9.6 239.6 8.2 25.4 133.4 
Off-wine 71.0 78.1 157.9 53.7 265.2 470.2 
Off-spirits 11.9 16.2 162.0 11.3 53.2 505.4 
Off-RTDs 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 
On-beer 170.7 972.4 1979.2 199.3 1093.2 2297.5 
On-cider 14.4 176.2 490.1 27.7 87.0 495.2 
On-wine 32.9 49.7 0.0 63.6 158.1 115.5 
On-spirits 76.7 652.6 667.5 126.4 388.2 706.4 
On-RTDs 10.3 0.0 0.0 5.7 3.6 0.0 
Total 429.1 2075.2 5055.0 524.0 2244.0 5135.5 
  
      After intervention / Change from baseline 
     Changes in consumption (std. drinks 
per drinker) 
-0.3 -1.5 -7.3 0.0 -1.0 -6.6 
Changes in consumption (%) -8.6% -7.3% -9.8% -0.6% -4.7% -11.0% 
Final Consumption (drinker) 3.7 19.5 67.9 4.6 21.0 52.9 
Absolute change in sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks per drinker per 
year 
   Off-beer -9.1 -52.2 -327.0 -5.7 -42.3 -247.2 
Off-cider -4.1 -10.2 1.2 -1.1 -10.6 -49.0 
Off-wine -0.4 -4.0 -21.1 2.0 5.7 -8.1 
Off-spirits -1.6 -3.1 -6.1 -1.1 -6.0 -25.7 
Off-RTDs -0.8 -2.7 -0.5 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 
On-beer -2.8 -4.8 -29.3 1.5 -5.3 -28.9 
On-cider 0.3 -2.1 2.2 1.5 2.9 16.5 
On-wine 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.4 4.1 4.3 
On-spirits -0.2 -5.5 -3.5 0.1 -1.7 -4.4 
On-RTDs 0.2 2.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Total -18.1 -80.4 -383.2 -1.5 -53.9 -342.3 
Absolute change in spending, euros per drinker 
per year 
     Off-beer -1.8 -11.0 -88.8 -0.2 -5.9 -55.9 
Off-cider -1.7 -4.6 45.9 -0.3 -3.5 -12.0 
Off-wine 4.1 8.7 28.8 7.2 33.9 83.3 
Off-spirits 0.6 2.2 13.4 1.9 2.9 -15.2 
Off-RTDs -0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
On-beer -6.5 -13.1 -60.8 4.5 -12.0 -62.5 
On-cider 0.4 -6.1 7.2 3.6 6.5 36.8 
On-wine 0.7 0.3 0.0 4.7 15.0 12.4 
On-spirits -0.7 -17.1 -5.9 1.1 -7.9 -16.8 
On-RTDs 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 
Total -4.5 -40.7 -60.1 23.3 29.5 -29.9 
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Table 5.17: Relative changes in price, consumption and spending, by beverage type and 
location for 90c MUP 
  
Change in 
price 
Change in 
consumption 
Change in 
spending 
Off-trade beer 31.5% -28.8% -6.3% 
Off-trade cider 19.4% -21.0% -5.7% 
Off-trade wine 12.2% 1.2% 13.5% 
Off-trade spirits 12.2% -8.7% 2.5% 
Off-trade RTDs 9.3% -27.3% -20.5% 
Subtotal: Off-trade 20.1% -13.9% 3.5% 
On-trade beer 0.2% -1.1% -0.9% 
On-trade cider 0.2% 7.0% 7.2% 
On-trade wine 0.2% 7.8% 8.0% 
On-trade spirits 0.4% -1.4% -1.1% 
On-trade RTDs -0.3% 15.9% 15.5% 
Subtotal: On-trade 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 
Subtotal: Beer  
-10.0% -1.8% 
Subtotal: Cider  
-6.2% 4.3% 
Subtotal: Wine  
2.4% 11.3% 
Subtotal: Spirits  
-4.7% -0.4% 
Subtotal: RTDs  
-3.2% 9.6% 
Total 7.9% -6.2% 1.3% 
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Table 5.18: Detailed full effect health outcomes by drinker group and income for 90c MUP 
  Population Low risk 
Increasing 
risk 
High 
risk 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per year  
1,270 -63
13
 496 837 312 958 
Changes in deaths 
per year 
-139 -7 -40 -92 -29 -110 
% change in deaths 
-11.0% 11.8% -8.1% -11.0% -9.4% -11.5% 
  
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per year 
(1,000s) 
59 8 23 28 13 46 
Changes in hospital 
admissions per year 
(1,000s) 
-4.1 -0.3 -1.2 -2.6 -1.0 -3.1 
% change in hospital 
admissions 
-7.0% -4.1% -5.1% -9.4% -7.8% -6.7% 
  
QALYs saved per 
year (1,000s) 
1.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.8 
Change in direct 
healthcare costs per 
year (€millions) 
-8.8 -0.2 -2.6 -6.0 -1.9 -6.9 
  
                                                          
13
 This value is negative because it is estimated that, due to the ‘protective’ effect of moderate alcohol 
consumption on ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke and type II diabetes, alcohol has an overall 
protective effect for low risk drinkers, although there is some debate in the scientific community that this 
effect exists at all (see, for example [38]) 
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Table 5.19: Detailed breakdown of deaths and hospital admissions averted by health 
condition type for 90c MUP 
Condition
* Deaths per year (full 
effect) 
Hospital admissions 
per year (full effect) 
Alcoholic liver disease -41 -450 
Cancers -29 -789 
Alcoholic poisoning -12 -38 
Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver disease) -12 -1031 
Intentional self-harm -11 -35 
Other diseases of the circulatory system -10 -351 
Road traffic accidents -8 -173 
Diseases of the digestive system -7 -79 
Other accidents -6 -247 
Hypertensive diseases -2 -621 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus -1 -79 
Assault -1 -54 
Diabetes mellitus 0 -20 
Other alcohol-related conditions 0 -136 
*Alcoholic liver disease – K70, Cancers – C00-14, C15, C18, C20, C22, C32, C50; Alcoholic poisoning – T51, X45, Y15, R78.0; Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver 
disease) – E24.4, G31.2, G62.1, G72.1, I42.6, K29.2, K86.0, F10; Intentional self-harm – X60-84; Other diseases of the circulatory system – I20-25, I47-48, I60-
62, I69.0-69.2, I66, I69.3, I69.4; Road traffic accidents - V12-14, V19.4-19.6, V19.9, V20-28, V29-79, V80.3-80.5, V81.1, V82.1, V83-86, V87.0-87.9, V89.2, V89.3, 
V89.9; Diseases of the digestive system – I85, K22.6, K73, K74, K80, K85, K86.1; Other accidents – V02-04, V06.1, V09.2, V09.3, V90-94, V95-97, W00-19, W24-
31, W32-34, W65-74, W78, X00-09, X31; Hypertensive diseases – I10-15; Epilepsy and status epilepticus – G40-41; Assault – X85-Y09; Diabetes Mellitus – E11; 
Other alcohol-related conditions – L40 excl. L40.5, O03. 
 
Table 5.20: Effects of 90c MUP on death and hospital admissions by drinker group 
 
Annual reductions following policy implementation 
Low risk Increasing risk High risk Total 
Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions 
Year 1 -9 -314 -18 -518 -26 -749 -52 -1582 
Year 5 -8 -335 -25 -765 -49 -1518 -83 -2618 
Year 10 -8 -340 -30 -922 -63 -1962 -101 -3224 
Year 15 -8 -336 -36 -1064 -79 -2311 -122 -3711 
Year 20 -7 -327 -40 -1183 -92 -2592 -139 -4102 
 
Table 5.21: Effects of 90c MUP on deaths and hospital admissions by income group 
  
Annual reductions following policy implementation 
Poverty Not Poverty Total 
Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions 
Year 1 -16 -540 -37 -1041 -52 -1582 
Year 5 -20 -762 -63 -1856 -83 -2618 
Year 10 -23 -886 -78 -2338 -101 -3224 
Year 15 -26 -969 -96 -2742 -122 -3711 
Year 20 -29 -1033 -110 -3070 -139 -4102 
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Figure 5.15: Effects of 90c MUP on deaths and hospital admissions by health condition 
 Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver disease) – E24.4, G31.2, G62.1, G72.1, I42.6, K29.2, K86.0, F10;  Alcoholic liver disease – K70; Alcoholic poisoning – T51, X45, Y15, R78.0;  Cancers – C00-14, C15, C18, C20, C22, C32, C50; Diabetes Mellitus – E11; 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus – G40-41; Hypertensive diseases – I10-15; Other diseases of the circulatory system – I20-25, I47-48, I60-62, I69.0-69.2, I66, I69.3, I69.4; Diseases of the digestive system – I85, K22.6, K73, K74, K80, K85, K86.1;   Road 
traffic accidents - V12-14, V19.4-19.6, V19.9, V20-28, V29-79, V80.3-80.5, V81.1, V82.1, V83-86, V87.0-87.9, V89.2, V89.3, V89.9; Other accidents – V02-04, V06.1, V09.2, V09.3, V90-94, V95-97, W00-19, W24-31, W32-34, W65-74, W78, X00-09, 
X31; Assault – X85-Y09; Intentional self-harm – X60-84; Other alcohol-related conditions – L40 excl. L40.5, O03
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5.3 EXAMPLE POLICY ANALYSIS B: 100C MUP 
 
This section describes the estimated impacts of a minimum unit price policy of 100c per standard 
drink in detail. We assume that this threshold is updated annually in line with inflation. In addition to 
the results already presented in Table 5.1 to Table 5.14, further detailed results are shown in Table 
5.22 to Table 5.26 and in Figure 5.16 for consumption changes, consumer spending and health 
outcomes including splitting effects into different types of alcoholic beverage. 
Across the whole population, 37.5% of alcohol purchased would be affected (i.e. would have their 
price raised to 100c). The proportion and absolute number of purchased standard drinks per week 
affected for high risk drinkers (47.0% or 29.4 std. drinks) is substantially more than for increasing risk 
drinkers (35.6% or 7.8 std. drinks) or low risk drinkers (33.4% or 1.1 std. drink). The proportion and 
number of purchased standard drinks per week affected is slightly higher for those in poverty than 
those above the poverty line (40.3% and 3.6 std. drinks vs. 36.9% and 3.5 std. drinks), though this 
difference is primarily driven by a considerable difference between high risk drinkers in poverty 
(57.5% or 43.3 std. drinks) vs. high risk drinkers not in poverty (44.0% or 26.2 std. drinks). 
Across the whole population, mean weekly consumption is estimated to change by -8.8%. 
Consumption is estimated to reduce by 0.83 std. drinks per person, or 1.06 std. drinks per drinker 
per week. Weekly consumption reductions are greater for high risk drinkers (-15.1% or 9.47 std. 
drinks) than low risk drinkers (-3.1% or 0.1 std. drinks) and for those in poverty (-12.3% or 1.6 std. 
drinks) compared to those not in poverty (-8.1% or 1.0 std. drinks). 
In both income groups, absolute reductions in consumption are estimated to be small for low risk 
drinkers and much larger for high risk drinkers. However, for people below the poverty line the 
relative change in consumption is similar across all drinkers, while for those above the poverty line 
the relative changes are considerably larger for heavier drinkers. The estimated consumption 
reduction for low risk drinkers in poverty is -12.0% or 0.5 std. drinks per week compared to -13.8% or 
10.41 std. drinks per week for high risk drinkers in poverty. The corresponding figures for those not 
in poverty are -1.4% or 0.01 std. drinks and -15.5% or 9.25 std. drinks. 
Across the whole population, spending increases by 1.3% or €15.70 per drinker per year (€0.30 per 
week). The cost impact of the policy on consumer spending varies significantly between different 
drinker and income subgroups. Low risk and increasing risk drinkers are estimated to increase their 
spending by €24.20 and €24.40 per year respectively, whilst high risk drinkers reduce their spending 
by €106.60. Similar differences are observed between income subgroups, with those in poverty 
saving €30.70 per year compared to a spending increase of €25.20 per year for those not in poverty. 
Those in poverty are estimated to save money at all levels of consumption, with low risk, 
increasing risk and high risk drinkers saving €6.80, €71.51 and €158.55 per year respectively. A 
different pattern is observed for those not in poverty, with low risk and increasing risk drinkers 
increasing their spending by €30.65 and €43.22 per year respectively, while high risk drinkers reduce 
their spending by €94.14. These differing patterns are a result of both the different proportion of 
each population subgroup’s purchases which are affected by the policy as well as the different price 
elasticities of the beverages which make up a greater or lesser proportion of each subgroup’s 
purchases. 
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Overall revenue to the Exchequer from duty and VAT receipts is estimated to reduce by 2.1% or 
€34.3 million14. 
Revenue to retailers is estimated to increase by €68.5million (18.1%) in the off-trade and 
€9.3million (0.7%) in the on-trade. This is as reduced sales volumes are more than offset by the 
increased value of remaining sales. 
Effects on health are estimated to be substantial, with alcohol-attributable deaths estimated to 
reduce by approximately 197 per year after 20 years, by which time the full effects of the policy will 
be seen. Annual deaths are distributed differentially across drinker groups with approximately 12 
saved amongst low risk drinkers, 57 amongst increasing risk drinkers and 128 amongst high risk 
drinkers. Whilst those in poverty see a smaller absolute number of reduced deaths (42 vs. 155 for 
those not in poverty), they also comprise a substantially smaller proportion of the population 
(18.9%), meaning that the relative reduction in annual deaths per 100,000 population is greater 
amongst those in poverty (6.2 vs. 5.4 per 100,000 for those not in poverty). 
Similar patterns are observed amongst reductions in alcohol-related hospital admissions, with an 
estimated 5,878 fewer admissions per year across the population. Admissions reductions for low 
risk, increasing risk and high risk drinkers are 550, 1,700 and 3,620 respectively. Again, those in 
poverty experience a lower absolute reduction in hospital admissions (1,520 vs. 4,350) but a larger 
reduction per 100,000 population (227 vs. 151). Direct healthcare costs are estimated to reduce by 
€7.4m in year 1 and €254.7m cumulatively over the first 20 years of the policy. 
Crime is estimated to fall by 1,493 offences per year overall. Reductions are spread relatively 
evenly between drinker groups, with 461, 547 and 485 fewer offences committed by low risk, 
increasing risk and high risk drinkers respectively. However, it should be noted that increasing risk 
and high risk drinkers (16% and 5% respectively) make up a considerably smaller proportion of the 
population than low risk drinkers (78%). Costs of crime and policing are estimated to reduce by 
€7.0m in year 1 and by €102.7 cumulatively over 20 years. 
Workplace absence is estimated to be reduced by 115,600 per year. This is estimated to lead to an 
annual saving of €16.1m in year 1 and €236.6m over 20 years.   
The total societal value of these reductions in health, crime and workplace harms is estimated at 
€1.7bn over the 20 year period modelled. This includes direct healthcare costs (€255m), crime costs 
(€103m), workplace costs (€237m) and a financial valuation of the QALY gain (€1.1bn), assuming a 
QALY is valued at €45,000. All costs and benefits are discounted at 3.5%. 
                                                          
14
 Please also see note in Section 6.4 on VAT reclaims 
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Table 5.22: Detailed consumption and spending results for 100c MUP 
  Population Male Female 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty Low risk 
Increasing 
risk High risk 
Baseline statistics 
   
Baseline Consumption 
(std. drinks per week) 
9.4 12.8 6.0 8.9 9.5 3.2 21.9 62.5 
Population size 3,551,435 
1,762,4
37 
1,788,99
8 
670,889 
2,880,54
6 
2,784,491 582,424 184,520 
Baseline Consumption 
(drinker) 
12.0 16.1 7.9 12.7 11.9 4.5 21.9 62.5 
Drinker population 2,766,183 
1,401,5
41 
1,364,64
2 
471,295 
2,294,88
8 
1,999,240 582,424 184,520 
% drinkers 77.9% 79.5% 76.3% 70.2% 79.7% 71.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks 
per drinker per year    
Off-beer 108.7 173.6 42.0 160.7 98.0 29.9 172.8 760.3 
Off-cider 28.7 32.4 25.0 51.6 24.0 9.1 31.5 232.6 
Off-wine 109.3 94.9 124.0 67.5 117.9 43.8 220.2 468.3 
Off-spirits 40.4 44.3 36.5 36.9 41.1 15.5 58.5 254.1 
Off-RTDs 1.8 0.9 2.8 4.5 1.3 1.3 3.8 1.4 
On-beer 230.2 393.8 62.1 212.8 233.8 82.1 462.6 1100.8 
On-cider 32.6 40.6 24.4 43.4 30.4 11.4 43.4 228.0 
On-wine 24.3 14.9 34.0 15.2 26.2 17.4 44.2 36.5 
On-spirits 49.6 43.8 55.6 65.1 46.5 23.8 98.8 174.6 
On-RTDs 2.3 0.2 4.4 5.5 1.6 1.5 4.4 3.9 
Total 628.0 839.5 410.8 663.2 620.7 235.8 1140.2 3260.5 
Spending, euros per drinker per year 
   
Off-beer 93.6 150.5 35.1 147.3 82.6 27.3 162.3 594.8 
Off-cider 21.2 25.2 17.1 26.8 20.0 8.4 22.9 153.9 
Off-wine 118.0 93.0 143.7 79.0 126.0 56.7 236.1 409.9 
Off-spirits 47.5 62.6 32.0 24.0 52.3 11.4 47.4 439.1 
Off-RTDs 1.0 0.6 1.5 1.8 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 
On-beer 515.8 860.4 161.9 461.6 527.0 194.3 1074.4 2236.0 
On-cider 72.6 86.2 58.6 81.5 70.8 25.4 100.9 494.3 
On-wine 78.1 46.8 110.3 33.7 87.2 58.3 141.3 93.2 
On-spirits 222.2 193.2 251.9 232.1 220.1 117.8 429.4 698.9 
On-RTDs 5.4 0.0 10.9 7.6 4.9 6.5 3.1 0.0 
Total 1175.3 1518.6 822.8 1095.3 1191.8 507.6 2217.7 5120.0 
After intervention / Change from 
baseline    
Changes in consumption 
(std. drinks per drinker) 
-1.1 -1.7 -0.4 -1.6 -1.0 -0.1 -1.6 -9.5 
Changes in consumption 
(%) 
-8.8% -10.7% -4.9% -12.3% -8.1% -3.1% -7.2% -15.1% 
Final Consumption 
(drinker) 
11.0 14.4 7.5 11.2 10.9 4.4 20.3 53.1 
Absolute change in sales/Consumption 
volume, std. drinks per drinker per year     
Off-beer -43.3 -72.5 -13.3 -56.8 -40.5 -9.0 -61.3 -358.1 
Off-cider -9.0 -13.1 -4.8 -8.0 -9.2 -2.4 -15.1 -61.2 
Off-wine 1.1 3.3 -1.1 -4.0 2.2 1.8 4.8 -18.1 
Off-spirits -4.6 -7.1 -2.1 -2.9 -5.0 -1.7 -7.7 -27.4 
Off-RTDs -0.7 -0.4 -1.1 -1.6 -0.5 -0.4 -1.9 -0.6 
On-beer -4.1 -6.0 -2.2 -8.0 -3.4 0.6 -7.0 -46.5 
On-cider 3.2 4.6 1.8 0.0 3.9 1.8 3.3 18.9 
On-wine 2.7 2.0 3.5 0.8 3.1 1.8 5.3 4.9 
On-spirits -1.2 -0.7 -1.7 -2.2 -1.0 0.0 -3.3 -6.7 
On-RTDs 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.8 
Total -55.4 -89.9 -20.0 -81.7 -50.0 -7.3 -81.8 -493.9 
Absolute change in spending, euros per 
drinker per year    
Off-beer -12.4 -21.5 -3.2 -19.0 -11.1 -1.6 -15.0 -121.9 
Off-cider -3.0 -4.7 -1.3 -0.7 -3.5 -1.0 -6.7 -13.7 
Off-wine 24.0 22.0 26.0 9.9 26.9 10.2 46.8 101.1 
Off-spirits 2.4 -1.5 6.4 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.6 -5.6 
Off-RTDs -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
On-beer -8.3 -11.3 -5.3 -18.2 -6.3 2.5 -16.6 -99.2 
On-cider 7.4 10.6 4.1 -0.4 9.0 4.2 7.2 43.4 
On-wine 8.9 6.1 11.9 1.0 10.6 5.8 18.2 13.7 
On-spirits -4.2 -2.0 -6.4 -6.7 -3.7 0.5 -13.9 -24.4 
On-RTDs 1.2 0.0 2.5 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.8 0.0 
Total 15.7 -2.5 34.5 -30.7 25.2 24.2 25.4 -106.6 
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Table 5.23: Detailed income and drinker group-specific results for 100c MUP 
  
In Poverty Not in Poverty 
Low risk Increasing risk High risk Low risk Increasing risk High risk 
Baseline statistics           
Baseline Consumption (std. drinks 
per week) 2.6 21.1 75.3 3.4 22.0 59.5 
Population size 544,638 90,629 35,623 2,239,854 491,795 148,897 
Baseline Consumption (drinker) 4.1 21.1 75.3 4.6 22.0 59.5 
Drinker population 345,044 90,629 35,623 1,654,196 491,795 148,897 
% drinkers 63.4% 100.0% 100.0% 73.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks per drinker per year         
Off-beer 31.6 174.4 1376.5 29.5 172.4 612.9 
Off-cider 13.9 24.4 486.1 8.1 32.8 171.9 
Off-wine 27.1 112.6 343.7 47.3 240.1 498.1 
Off-spirits 19.1 45.5 188.6 14.7 60.8 269.7 
Off-RTDs 3.8 7.6 2.7 0.8 3.1 1.1 
On-beer 73.6 433.8 998.2 83.9 467.8 1125.4 
On-cider 12.1 75.0 266.5 11.3 37.6 218.8 
On-wine 9.5 37.8 13.1 19.0 45.4 42.1 
On-spirits 18.7 172.0 242.5 24.8 85.3 158.4 
On-RTDs 2.6 15.9 7.4 1.3 2.3 3.0 
Total 211.9 1099.2 3925.3 240.7 1147.7 3101.4 
Spending, euros per drinker per 
year 
      Off-beer 29.3 120.4 1358.8 26.9 170.1 412.0 
Off-cider 9.3 9.6 239.6 8.2 25.4 133.4 
Off-wine 71.0 78.1 157.9 53.7 265.2 470.2 
Off-spirits 11.9 16.2 162.0 11.3 53.2 505.4 
Off-RTDs 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 
On-beer 170.7 972.4 1979.2 199.3 1093.2 2297.5 
On-cider 14.4 176.2 490.1 27.7 87.0 495.2 
On-wine 32.9 49.7 0.0 63.6 158.1 115.5 
On-spirits 76.7 652.6 667.5 126.4 388.2 706.4 
On-RTDs 10.3 0.0 0.0 5.7 3.6 0.0 
Total 429.1 2075.2 5055.0 524.0 2244.0 5135.5 
  
  
  
   After intervention / Change from baseline       
Changes in consumption (std. 
drinks per drinker) 
-0.5 -2.2 -10.4 -0.1 -1.5 -9.2 
Changes in consumption (%) -12.0% -10.4% -13.8% -1.4% -6.6% -15.5% 
Final Consumption (drinker) 3.6 18.9 64.9 4.6 20.6 50.2 
Absolute change in sales/Consumption volume, std. drinks per drinker per 
year 
   Off-beer -12.7 -74.1 -440.4 -8.3 -58.9 -338.4 
Off-cider -5.9 -13.2 -15.4 -1.7 -15.5 -72.2 
Off-wine -0.6 -6.4 -30.7 2.3 6.9 -15.1 
Off-spirits -2.2 -4.2 -6.5 -1.5 -8.3 -32.4 
Off-RTDs -1.2 -3.7 -0.6 -0.2 -1.5 -0.6 
On-beer -4.0 -7.5 -47.3 1.6 -6.9 -46.3 
On-cider 0.5 -3.2 2.6 2.0 4.5 22.8 
On-wine 0.5 1.9 0.4 2.0 5.9 6.0 
On-spirits -0.3 -8.2 -5.8 0.0 -2.4 -6.9 
On-RTDs 0.4 4.1 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 
Total -25.4 -114.6 -542.8 -3.5 -75.7 -482.2 
Absolute change in spending, euros per drinker per year 
    Off-beer -3.7 -22.8 -157.1 -1.1 -13.6 -113.5 
Off-cider -3.0 -7.3 37.6 -0.5 -6.6 -26.0 
Off-wine 6.3 12.2 38.7 11.1 53.1 116.1 
Off-spirits 1.1 2.0 21.2 2.8 5.1 -12.0 
Off-RTDs -1.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 
On-beer -9.3 -20.2 -98.7 5.0 -15.9 -99.3 
On-cider 0.6 -9.2 11.9 4.9 10.2 50.9 
On-wine 1.2 0.4 0.0 6.7 21.5 17.0 
On-spirits -0.9 -26.6 -12.3 0.8 -11.5 -27.3 
On-RTDs 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 
Total -6.8 -71.5 -158.5 30.7 43.2 -94.1 
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Table 5.24: Relative changes in price, consumption and spending, by beverage type and 
location for 100c MUP 
  
Change 
in price 
Change in 
consumption 
Change in 
spending 
Off-trade beer 44.2% -39.9% -13.3% 
Off-trade cider 24.9% -31.4% -14.2% 
Off-trade wine 19.1% 1.0% 20.3% 
Off-trade spirits 18.6% -11.5% 5.0% 
Off-trade RTDs 15.9% -40.0% -30.5% 
Subtotal: Off-
trade 29.0% -19.6% 3.8% 
On-trade beer 0.2% -1.8% -1.6% 
On-trade cider 0.3% 9.9% 10.2% 
On-trade wine 0.2% 11.2% 11.4% 
On-trade spirits 0.5% -2.4% -1.9% 
On-trade RTDs -0.4% 23.1% 22.7% 
Subtotal: On-
trade 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 
Subtotal: Beer 
 
-14.0% -3.4% 
Subtotal: Cider 
 
-9.4% 4.7% 
Subtotal: Wine 
 
2.9% 16.8% 
Subtotal: Spirits 
 
-6.5% -0.7% 
Subtotal: RTDs 
 
-4.9% 13.9% 
Total 11.1% -8.8% 1.3% 
 
Table 5.25: Detailed full effect health outcomes by drinker group and income for 100c MUP 
  Population Low risk 
Increasing 
risk 
High risk 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per year  
1270 -63 496 837 312 958 
Changes in deaths 
per year 
-197 -12 -57 -128 -42 -155 
% change in deaths 
-15.5% 18.8% -11.5% -15.3% -13.4% -16.2% 
  
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per year 
(1,000s) 
59 8 23 28 13 46 
Hospital admissions 
per year (1,000s) 
-5.9 -0.55 -1.70 -3.62 -1.52 -4.35 
% change in hospital 
admissions 
-10.0% -6.9% -7.3% -13.2% -11.6% -9.5% 
  
QALYs saved per 
year (1,000s) 
1.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.2 
Healthcare costs per 
year (€millions) 
-12.6 -0.4 -3.7 -8.5 -2.9 -9.7 
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Table 5.26: Detailed breakdown of deaths and hospital admissions averted by health 
condition type for 100c MUP 
Condition
* Deaths per year (full 
effect) 
Hospital admissions 
per year (full effect) 
Alcoholic liver disease -57 -621 
Cancers -41 -1123 
Alcoholic poisoning -17 -55 
Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver disease) -17 -1485 
Intentional self-harm -15 -50 
Other disease of the circulatory system -14 -482 
Road traffic accidents -12 -246 
Diseases of the digestive system -10 -110 
Other accidents -8 -358 
Hypertensive diseases -3 -930 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus -2 -114 
Assault -1 -77 
Diabetes mellitus 0 -25 
Other alcohol-related conditions 0 -202 
*Alcoholic liver disease – K70, Cancers – C00-14, C15, C18, C20, C22, C32, C50, Alcoholic poisoning – T51, X45, Y15, R78.0, Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver 
disease) – E24.4, G31.2, G62.1, G72.1, I42.6, K29.2, K86.0, F10, Intentional self-harm – X60-84, Other diseases of the circulatory system – I20-25, I47-48, I60-
62, I69.0-69.2, I66, I69.3, I69.4, Road traffic accidents - V12-14, V19.4-19.6, V19.9, V20-28, V29-79, V80.3-80.5, V81.1, V82.1, V83-86, V87.0-87.9, V89.2, V89.3, 
V89.9, Diseases of the digestive system – I85, K22.6, K73, K74, K80, K85, K86.1, Other accidents – V02-04, V06.1, V09.2, V09.3, V90-94, V95-97, W00-19, W24-
31, W32-34, W65-74, W78, X00-09, X31, Hypertensive diseases – I10-15, Epilepsy and status epilepticus – G40-41, Assault – X85-Y09, Diabetes Mellitus – E11, 
Other alcohol-related conditions – L40 excl. L40.5, O03. 
 
Table 5.27: Effects of 100c MUP on death and hospital admissions by drinker group 
 
Annual reductions following policy implementation 
Low risk Increasing risk High risk Total 
Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions 
Year 1 -13 -492 -25 -741 -37 -1062 -75 -2295 
Year 5 -12 -534 -36 -1100 -70 -2144 -118 -3778 
Year 10 -12 -549 -42 -1325 -89 -2761 -143 -4636 
Year 15 -12 -556 -50 -1530 -111 -3239 -173 -5325 
Year 20 -12 -553 -57 -1702 -128 -3623 -197 -5878 
 
Table 5.28: Effects of 100c MUP on deaths and hospital admissions by income group 
  
Annual reductions following policy implementation 
Poverty Not Poverty Total 
Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions 
Year 1 -22 -773 -53 -1522 -75 -2295 
Year 5 -29 -1118 -89 -2661 -118 -3778 
Year 10 -33 -1309 -110 -3326 -143 -4636 
Year 15 -38 -1431 -135 -3894 -173 -5325 
Year 20 -42 -1524 -155 -4354 -197 -5878 
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Figure 5.16: Effects of 100c MUP on deaths and hospital admissions 
 
Alcoholic disorders (excl. liver disease) – E24.4, G31.2, G62.1, G72.1, I42.6, K29.2, K86.0, F10;  Alcoholic liver disease – K70; Alcoholic poisoning – T51, X45, Y15, R78.0;  Cancers – C00-14, C15, C18, C20, C22, C32, C50; Diabetes Mellitus – E11; 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus – G40-41; Hypertensive diseases – I10-15; Other diseases of the circulatory system – I20-25, I47-48, I60-62, I69.0-69.2, I66, I69.3, I69.4; Diseases of the digestive system – I85, K22.6, K73, K74, K80, K85, K86.1;   Road 
traffic accidents - V12-14, V19.4-19.6, V19.9, V20-28, V29-79, V80.3-80.5, V81.1, V82.1, V83-86, V87.0-87.9, V89.2, V89.3, V89.9; Other accidents – V02-04, V06.1, V09.2, V09.3, V90-94, V95-97, W00-19, W24-31, W32-34, W65-74, W78, X00-09, 
X31; Assault – X85-Y09; Intentional self-harm – X60-84; Other alcohol-related conditions – L40 excl. L40.5, O03  
92 
 
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Table 5.29, Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 compare the estimated impacts on alcohol consumption of a 
90c MUP and a ban on off-trade promotions using alternative elasticity estimates as described in 
Section 4.7. 
 
Table 5.29: Comparison of estimated impacts on alcohol consumption for a 90c MUP and 
off-trade promotion ban using alternative elasticity estimates 
  
90c MUP: alternative elasticities 
Base case 
SA1: 
NADS 
elasticities 
SA2: 
No cross-
price 
SA3: 
No non-
significant 
SA4: 
Consumption level-
specific 
Population -6.2% -27.6% -7.6% -7.1% -5.6% 
Low risk -1.9% -23.4% -4.6% -4.3% -4.8% 
Increasing 
risk 
-5.1% -25.9% -6.0% -5.8% -4.7% 
High risk -10.7% -32.7% -11.8% -10.6% -7.1% 
In poverty -8.7% -18.4% -8.6% -7.5% -3.9% 
Not in 
poverty 
-5.6% -29.6% -7.4% -7.0% -5.9% 
  
Ban on off-trade promotions: alternative elasticities 
Base case 
SA1: 
NADS 
elasticities 
SA2: 
No cross-
price 
SA3: 
No non-
significant 
SA4: 
Consumption level-
specific 
Population -1.8% -9.6% -2.2% -2.0% -1.5% 
Low risk -0.7% -8.6% -1.4% -1.2% -1.8% 
Increasing 
risk 
-1.4% -9.8% -1.8% -1.7% -1.2% 
High risk -3.0% -10.1% -3.2% -2.8% -1.5% 
In poverty -2.6% -6.8% -2.3% -2.0% -1.2% 
Not in 
poverty 
-1.6% -10.2% -2.2% -1.9% -1.5% 
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Figure 5.17: Comparison of estimated impacts on alcohol consumption of a 90c MUP policy 
using alternative elasticity estimates 
 
Figure 5.18: Comparison of estimated impacts on alcohol consumption of an off-trade 
promotion ban using alternative elasticity estimates 
 
The results for a 90c MUP suggest that the base case model is relatively conservative in terms of 
estimated scale of impact for the overall population when compared to the alternative sensitivity 
analyses. Only SA4 estimates a slightly lower estimated reduction in population consumption of -
5.6% compared to -6.2% for the base case. The impacts estimated using the NADS-derived 
elasticities (SA1) are substantially larger than any of the other alternatives considered and may be 
considered to be implausible. The effects of the different sensitivity analyses are not uniform across 
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subgroups, for example SA4 shows a smaller impact on those in poverty, while SA2 shows a greater 
impact on high risk drinkers. Results for an off-trade promotion ban are very similar, though the 
absolute magnitude of the estimated consumption reductions in smaller. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
This research study presents the synthesis of evidence available to undertake policy appraisal of 21 
options for price regulation of alcohol in Ireland.  In this discussion section, we draw out the key 
themes and findings from the detailed analysis. 
 
6.1 DIFFERENTIAL POLICY IMPACTS 
We have examined 9 policy options for a minimum price threshold ranging from 40c to 120c per 
standard drink.  The estimated per person reduction in alcohol consumption for the overall 
population ranges from 0.0% to 14.6% for an MUP policy within this range, with higher MUP 
thresholds leading to greater reductions in consumption. These consumption reductions lead to 
estimated reductions in deaths from 1 to 312 per year, hospital admissions from 46 to 9,483 per 
year, crime from 2 to 2,453 per year and days absence from work from 500 to 197,100 per year, 
again with higher MUP thresholds leading to greater reductions in alcohol-related harms. 
Specifically, a 90c MUP policy is estimated to reduce per person alcohol consumption by 6.2% and 
lead to 139 fewer deaths, 4,102 fewer hospital admissions, 1,043 fewer crimes and 77,800 fewer 
absent days in Ireland per year. 
In contrast, a policy to ban below-cost selling has virtually no impact on consumption and alcohol-
related harms because most alcohol sold in the market would not be affected by the policy.  
A policy to ban all price-based promotion in the off-trade is estimated to reduce per person alcohol 
consumption by 1.8% and leads to 45 fewer deaths, 1,382 fewer hospital admissions, 271 fewer 
crimes and 21,400 fewer absent days in Ireland per year. The same pattern of consumption and 
harm reductions is found for policies combining MUP and a ban on price-based promotion in the off-
trade, with higher MUP thresholds leading to greater reductions in consumption and alcohol-related 
harms. For the same MUP threshold, a combined policy is more effective in consumption and harm 
reduction than the single MUP policy, but the additional benefit is diminishing as the MUP threshold 
increases. For example, per person consumption reductions for without a promotions ban versus 
with the promotions ban are estimated to be 0.7% versus 2.6% (difference is 1.9%) for a 60c MUP, 
6.2% versus 7.1% (difference is 0.9%) for 60c, and there is no difference for a 120c MUP.  
In summary, MUP policies are estimated to reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related 
mortality, hospital admissions, crime and absence from work in Ireland either as a single policy or in 
combination with a ban on price-based promotion in the off-trade; and the higher the threshold at 
which an MUP is set, the greater the reduction in alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms. 
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6.2 IMPACTS BY DRINKER GROUP 
In line with findings from previous studies in England, Scotland and Canada, this analysis shows that 
MUP is a policy targeted at increasing risk and high risk drinkers [2], [3], [6]. The main reason for this 
is that high risk drinkers tend to favour the cheaper alcohol, which is the alcohol most affected by 
MUP policies. See for example Figure 4.8 which shows that high risk drinkers buy almost half of their 
alcohol at below 90c per standard drink, whereas low risk drinkers buy around a third of their 
alcohol below this threshold.  
A 90c MUP is estimated to reduce alcohol consumption by 1.9%, 5.1% and 10.7% for low risk, 
increasing risk and high risk drinkers respectively. The absolute reduction in standard drinks 
consumed is estimated at 0.1 per week for low risk drinkers, 1.1 per week for increasing risk, and 6.7 
per week for high risk drinkers.  So it is the high risk drinkers who are most affected in terms of scale 
of consumption reduction. 
This in turn is reflected in the harm reductions for the 90c MUP policy. High risk drinkers, who make 
up 5% of the population, benefit from 92 out of 139 (66%) and 2,600 out of 4,100 (63%) estimated 
annual reductions in deaths and hospital admissions from the policy. 
 
6.3 IMPACTS BY INCOME 
The analyses also present income-specific results from SAPM3 for Ireland and five main findings 
should be highlighted.  
First, when interpreting these results, it should be borne in mind that 29.8% of those in poverty are 
non-drinkers compared to 20.3% of those not in poverty and, amongst low risk drinkers, those in 
poverty consume 4.1 standard drinks per week compared to 4.6 standard drinks for those not in 
poverty. Therefore, the subgroup of the population which is in poverty contains a disproportionate 
number of people who will be wholly or largely unaffected by the direct impacts of MUP due to their 
abstinence or relatively low consumption.  
Second, MUP impacts on the consumption of both in poverty and not in poverty income groups; 
however, it has a greater relative impact on the consumption of drinkers in poverty. As we assume 
drinkers in poverty and not in poverty are equally responsive to price changes when they have the 
same consumption patterns, this difference in estimated policy impact is due to 1) drinkers in 
poverty tending to buy more products from the cheaper end of the spectrum, and 2) the larger price 
elasticities of the products favoured by drinkers in poverty, particularly beer and cider purchased in 
the off-trade.  
Third, the impact of a 90c MUP on some groups is very small in absolute terms.  Consumption 
amongst low risk drinkers in poverty and not in poverty respectively would fall by just 18.1 and 1.5 
standard drinks per year. This compares with an average reduction of 383 standard drinks for in 
poverty high risk drinkers and 342 standard drinks for not in poverty high risk drinkers.   
Fourth, the impact of a MUP on the spending of drinkers in poverty is smaller overall than the 
impact on spending of drinkers who are not in poverty. This is because the products favoured by 
drinkers not in poverty have smaller price elasticities and thus, although drinkers not in poverty do 
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reduce their consumption, they are also more likely to increase their spending in response to price 
increases. 
Finally, the greater fall in consumption amongst drinkers in poverty also leads to greater reductions 
in alcohol-related health harms within this group considering that they make up only 19% of the 
population. For a 90c MUP, the estimated reductions in deaths are 4.4 and 3.8 per 100,000 
population for drinkers in poverty and not in poverty respectively. For hospital admissions, the 
estimated reductions are 153.9 and 106.6 per 100,000 population for drinkers in poverty and not in 
poverty. 
In summary, the income-specific analysis of the potential impacts of a 90c MUP suggests that MUP 
will impact on both drinkers in poverty and not in poverty and that, within each income group, the 
impacts on high risk drinkers will be substantial and greater than the impacts on low risk drinkers. A 
key policy concern is whether low risk drinkers in poverty are ‘penalised’ by MUP. Policy impacts on 
low risk drinkers in poverty are small in absolute terms, amounting to a consumption reduction of 
just 18.1 standard drinks per year and a spending reduction of €4.50 per year. As low risk consumers 
make up 95.4% of the in poverty population and 36.6% of these are abstainers and thus not directly 
affected by the policy, our estimates suggest only a small minority of those in poverty will be 
substantially impacted by MUP and these individuals will be those who, though in poverty, consume 
at increasing risk or high risk levels. The greater health benefits of MUP for drinkers in poverty 
suggest the policy may also contribute to the reduction of health inequalities.  
 
6.4 IMPACTS ON REVENUE TO THE EXCHEQUER AND RETAILERS 
When prices and consumption change then the revenue to government will change also because 
duty is levied on amount of ethanol content (e.g. beer and spirits) or product volume (e.g. wine and 
cider) that is sold, and VAT is charged on the sales value.  
A 90c MUP is estimated to lead to an overall decrease in revenue for the Exchequer of €21.4 m 
(1.3%), with a decrease in duty plus VAT revenue from the off-trade of €26.1m (6.5%) and a small 
increase from the on-trade of €4.8m (0.4%). The decrease in duty plus VAT revenue from the off-
trade is mainly due to the decrease in off-trade duty receipts which are directly linked to the 
reduction in alcohol consumption, as duty is levied on either ethanol content (e.g. beer and spirits) 
or product volume (e.g. wine and cider). It is important to note that these estimates do not account 
for current VAT reclaims on products sold below the cost of production. MUP policies are likely to 
significantly reduce the amount of alcohol sold at below cost and, as a consequence, the associated 
VAT reclaims. Unofficial estimates place the annual reclaim at €21million [34], suggesting the actual 
impact on revenue to the Exchequer of the modelled policies may be somewhat smaller than the 
estimates presented here. 
Retailers’ revenues are affected to a larger extent than those of government.  A 90c MUP is 
estimated to lead to an overall increase in revenue for retailers of €62.6m (3.8%), with increase in 
revenue for off-trade retailers of €53.3m (14.1%) and for on-trade retailers of €9.3m (0.7%).  
The relative inelasticity of alcohol (see Table 4.3 where most estimated own-price elasticities are 
smaller than 1) means that the average consumer response to alcohol price increases includes 
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paying more as well as buying less, and when elasticities are less than 1, spending and hence 
revenue to retailers increases even though consumption falls.  
Table 4.3 also shows that there is a mix of positive and negative cross-price elasticities of demand for 
on-trade beverages with regard to off-trade prices, and the magnitude of these cross-price 
elasticities are smaller than the own-price elasticities. This leads to the small increase in revenue for 
on-trade retailers even though the prices of products in the on-trade are largely unaffected by the 
policy.  
Caution is required regarding the estimated impacts on revenue for on-trade due to the lack of 
statistical significance for many of the cross-price elasticities.  
It should also be noted that considerable uncertainty exists regarding retailers’ responses to the 
introduction of a MUP. SAPM3 assumes the only change in pricing that will occur is for all prices of 
products below the MUP threshold to be raised up to that threshold. In reality, retailers and 
producers may make a range of additional changes to both prices and products which may impact 
on resulting revenue changes to the Exchequer and retailers and other modelled outcomes. 
 
6.5 IMPACTS ON ALCOHOL-RELATED HEALTH 
A 90c MUP policy is estimated to lead to 139 fewer deaths and 4102 fewer hospital admissions per 
year at full effect. As illustrated in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, the impact on acute health conditions is felt 
immediately, whilst the reduction in deaths and admissions from chronic causes increases steadily 
across the first 20 years of the policy. Tables 5.20 and 5.21 show that the impact on health across 
time varies by drinker and income group, for example, whilst the majority of health gains for low risk 
drinkers are experienced in the short term, the full benefits for high risk drinkers take longer to 
develop, with the full effect only being felt after 20 years. The savings to the Health Service from 
these reductions in alcohol-related illness are estimated to be €5.2million in the first year following 
implementation of the policy, with higher MUP thresholds providing even greater benefits. 
These figures are likely to underestimate the true impact as the morbidity data is based on hospital 
in-patient admissions data and therefore excludes patients presenting at either Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) departments or in primary care who do not subsequently go on to attend hospital 
for the same condition. This is particularly likely to lead to an underestimate of the true prevalence 
of some acute health conditions such as ethanol poisoning or falls where patients are more likely to 
be treated at A&E and then sent home directly. It is also likely that the cost savings to the Health 
Service are underestimated as they do not include any A&E or primary care related costs, both of 
which are likely to reduce to some extent following the introduction of any of the modelled policies.  
Finally, it should be noted that the existing evidence on the temporal relationship between changes 
in alcohol consumption and changes in risk is relatively limited. For those chronic health conditions 
for which no evidence could be identified we have assumed that the change in risk is linear over 20 
years. This is likely to be conservative as the available evidence for other conditions suggests that 
the greatest reduction in risk occurs in the years immediately after the change in consumption [28]. 
In terms of the partial effects analysis presented in Table 5.9, Table 5.10 , Table 5.20, Table 5.21, 
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Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 this suggests that the actual impact of the modelled policies on deaths 
and hospital admissions at years 1 and 5 in particular may be underestimated. 
 
6.6 IMPACTS ON ALCOHOL-RELATED CRIME 
A 90c MUP is estimated to lead to 1,043 fewer crimes. High risk drinkers, who comprise around 5% 
of the population, account for 33% of this reduction. Costs of crime are estimated to reduce by 
€4.9m in year 1 under this policy, with higher MUP thresholds providing even greater savings (e.g. 
€11.5m in year 1 for a 120c MUP). Unlike health gains, which increase over time, the full impact of 
an MUP policy on crime would be experienced within the first year. 
This is most likely to be an underestimation of the true impact because 1) The AAF estimates used to 
calibrate the crime risk functions (see Section 4.5.3) which were derived from the Offending Crime 
and Justice Survey were based on a question asking respondents whether alcohol was one of the 
reasons for committing the crime, rather than a question asking whether the offender was drunk 
when the crime was committed. It is likely that the responses to the former question underestimate 
the impact of alcohol on crime levels, whilst the latter question would overestimate this impact; and 
2) the crime categories shown in Table 4.8 and included in the model exclude a number of offences 
which have some alcohol-related component (e.g. drink-driving and public disorder offences). These 
offences were excluded because of either a lack of evidence on the AAF of the offence or because of 
a lack of available evidence on the valuation of the harm. 
 
6.7 IMPACTS ON WORK ABSENCE 
Workplace absence is estimated to fall under all modelled policies, with a reduction of 77,800 days 
absent per year for a 90c MUP, valued at €10.9m in the first year following implementation of the 
policy. As with the impact on crime, the full impact of an MUP policy on work absence would be 
experienced within the first year.  
 
6.8 COST IMPACTS ON SOCIETY 
A 90c MUP is estimated to lead to a cumulative saving to society of €1.2bn over 20 years from 
reductions in direct health costs (€178m), crime costs (€72m), reduced workplace absence (€160m) 
and gains in societal health (€775m). It should be noted that these figures do not include the 
potential productivity gain to society of those people who live longer or in better health as a result 
of the policy. 
 
6.9 POTENTIAL IMPACT OF MUP AND PRICE-BASED PROMOTIONS BAN ON 
CROSS-BORDER SHOPPING 
Owing to the shared land border and differential tax regimes between the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, shopping trips across the border to Northern Ireland do occur. In 2010 the Irish 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) included a series of questions on cross border 
shopping in Northern Ireland by Irish residents [35]. The results of this survey show that in 2010 an 
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estimated 14% of households in Ireland made at least one shopping trip across the border, spending 
an average of €274 per trip [35]. Of this total €33 (12%) was spent on alcohol on average, with the 
majority (66%) being spent on groceries (€105) or clothing and other durables (€77). Households in 
the Border region were more than twice as likely to have shopped across the border as those from 
any other region (43% compared to 19% or less) and accounted for over half the total expenditure 
on cross-border shopping (€240million out of €418million). Around three quarters (25.6%) of 
spending cross-border was on dedicated shopping trips rather than expenditure on non-shopping 
trips. 
In addition to the QNHS figures, respondents to the NADS were asked whether the alcohol they had 
purchased in the last week was purchased in the country or abroad (including Northern Ireland). An 
exploratory analysis of this data suggests that survey respondents paid an average of 31% less per 
standard drink for alcohol purchased abroad. 
Taken together, these surveys suggest that Irish residents may be purchasing cheaper alcohol in 
Northern Ireland. However; the fact that alcohol represents a relatively small percentage of the total 
spend on cross-border shopping trips suggests that it may not be the principal motivation for most 
of these trips. Whilst it is therefore likely that MUP policies or promotions bans which increase the 
price of some alcohol may lead to some increase in cross-border purchasing in Northern Ireland, 
reducing the estimated impact of the policies, it is probable that such changes in purchasing habits 
will be small, especially for the large majority of the population (90%) who live outside the Border 
region. 
 
6.10 RELATIVE MERITS OF MUP AND PRICE-BASED PROMOTIONS BAN IN 
COMPARISON WITH TAX INCREASES.  
Modelling of taxation policies was out-with the scope of this report. It is nevertheless worthwhile 
rehearsing for policy makers some key principles in terms of the difference in targeting between 
MUP and general tax rises.   
Firstly, MUP is targeted at increasing the price only of cheap alcohol sold below the MUP threshold.  
In contrast, it is expected that a tax increase (most likely through increased duty rates) would 
increase the price of all alcohol sold in the market because alcohol duties are levied on either 
ethanol content or product volume. The likelihood is therefore that low risk drinkers would be much 
more affected by a general tax rise than a MUP policy targeted at cheaper alcohol.  
Secondly, there is the issue of whether and how retailers pass through the tax increases to 
customers. A recent UK study shows that when duty increases, supermarkets have tended to  
increase the price of more expensive alcohol more than the tax increase and increase the price of 
cheaper alcohol less than the tax increase [36].  This in turn is likely to reduce the impact of the tax 
policy on increasing and high risk drinkers and drinkers who prefer cheaper alcohol.  
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8 APPENDIX A 
Table 8.1: Modelled time-lags by condition – proportion of overall change in risk experienced in each year following a change in consumption 
taken from Holmes et al 2012 
Condition 
Year from change in consumption 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-
Cushing's syndrome 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Degeneration of the nervous 
system 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Alcoholic myopathy 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Alcoholic gastritis 50% 25% 13% 6% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Alcoholic liver disease 21% 13% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Chronic pancreatitis 20% 16% 13% 10% 8% 7% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral 
cavity and pharynx 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malignant neoplasm of 
oesophagus 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malignant neoplasm of colon 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malig. neoplasm of liver and 
intrahepatic bile ducts 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malignant neoplasm of breast 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) 22% 18% 14% 11% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus 43% 26% 16% 9% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Hypertensive diseases 22% 18% 14% 11% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ischaemic heart disease 31% 22% 15% 11% 7% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Cardiac arrhythmias 22% 18% 14% 11% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Haemorrhagic stroke 31% 22% 15% 11% 7% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ischaemic stroke 31% 22% 15% 11% 7% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Oesophageal varices  10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Gastro-oesophageal laceration-
haemorrhage synd. 
10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Unspecified liver disease 20% 16% 13% 10% 8% 7% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Cholelithiasis 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 20% 16% 13% 10% 8% 7% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Psoriasis 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Spontaneous abortion 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
